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INTRODUCTION
A. Crawford and "Forfeiture" by Wrongdoing
Crawford v. Washington' redefined the Supreme Court's Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence and has given unexpected prominence to the rule now known as "for-
feiture" by wrongdoing. That doctrine holds that a criminal defendant responsible
for a witness's unavailability at trial cannot object to the admission of the absent
witness's hearsay testimony.2 The "forfeiture" doctrine is the only broad exception
to Crawford's holding that an unavailable witness's out-of-court "testimonial"
statements do not satisfy the Sixth Amendment unless the defendant has the oppor-
tunity to cross-examine the declarant.' Many excited utterances or statements against
penal interest or for purposes of medical treatment that were admissible under Ohio
v. Roberts4 now are inadmissible because the declarant was not subject to cross-ex-
amination. Prosecutions for domestic violence, child abuse, and criminal conspiracies
often rely on the hearsay statements of absent and unavailable witnesses. These
cases are particularly affected by Crawford because the victims often are unavailable,
reluctant to testify, prone to recant prior statements, or, by reason of tender age, may
be unlikely to testify.5
1 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
2 James F. Flanagan, Forfeiture by Wrongdoing and Those Who Acquiesce in Witness
Intimidation: A Reach Exceeding Its Grasp and Other Problems With Federal Rule of Evidence
804(b)(6), 51 DRAKE L. REv. 459 (2003). See also Leonard Birdsong, The Exclusion of Hear-
say Through Forfeiture by Wrongdoing - Old Wine in a New Bottle - Solving the Mystery
of the Codification of the Concept into Federal Rule 804(b)(6), 80 NEB. L. REv. 891 (2001);
Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation and the Definition of Chutzpa, 31 ISR. L. REV. 506 (1997)
[hereinafter Friedman, Chutzpa]; John R. Kroger, The Confrontation Waiver Rule, 76 B.U.
L. REv. 835 (1996); Alycia Sykora, Forfeiture by Misconduct: Proposed Federal Rule of Ev-
idence 804(b)(6), 75 OR. L. REv. 855 (1996); Enrico B. Valdez & Shelley A. Nieto Dahlberg,
Tales from the Crypt: An Examination of Forfeiture by Misconduct and Its Applicability to
the Texas Legal System, 31 ST. MARY'S L.J. 99 (1999); Paul T. Markland, Comment, The
Admission of Hearsay Evidence Where Defendant Misconduct Causes the Unavailability of
a Prosecution Witness, 43 AM. U. L. REv. 995 (1994); David J. Tess, Note, Losing the Right
to Confront: Defining Waiver to Better Address a Defendant's Actions and Their Effects on
a Witness, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 877 (1994).
3 The Court read the Sixth Amendment as referring "to the right of confrontation at com-
mon law, admitting only those exceptions established at the time of the founding." Crawford,
541 U.S. at 54. The principal exception discussed in the opinion was for statements made as
dying declarations; Justice Scalia may be willing to accept an exception for dying declarations
on historical grounds. Id. at 56 n.6.
4 448 U.S. 56 (1980), overruled by Crawford, 541 U.S. 36.
5 Andrew King-Ries, Crawford v. Washington: The End of Victimless Prosecution?, 28
SEATrLE U. L. REv. 301 (2005); Adam M. Krischer, "Though Justice May Be Blind, It Is Not
Stupid": Applying Common Sense to Crawford in Domestic Violence Cases, PROSECUTOR,
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The full ramifications of Crawford depend on how the courts ultimately define
two key terms in the opinion. The most critical issue is the definition of "testimo-
nial," because only those statements must be subject to cross-examination at some
point in order to be admissible.6 Justice Scalia cited three possible and overlapping
definitions. The first was "'exparte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent
- that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that
the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants
would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially." 7 The second includes .'extraju-
dicial statements ... contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits,
depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.' 8 The third definition is "'statements
that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reason-
ably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial." 9 The
courts are now grappling with how to define "testimonial" and how to apply it in
many interactions with the police - from 911 calls to police inquiries upon arriving
at the scene. Significantly, the first post-Crawford cases heard by the Supreme
Court involve those issues. "o This issue is beyond the scope of the Article. However
defined, Crawford establishes a categorical rule: testimonial statements must be sub-
ject to cross-examination at some point to be admissible, even though they might sa-
tisfy an exception to the rule against hearsay or otherwise be found reliable." Prosecu-
tors are seeking a narrow, and defense counsel a broader, definition of "testimonial."
Nov./Dec. 2004, at 14; Allie Phillips, A Flurry of Court Interpretations: Weathering the
Storm After Crawford v. Washington, PROSECUTOR, Nov./Dec. 2004, at 37; Myrna S. Raeder,
Domestic Violence, ChildAbuse, and Trustworthiness Exceptions After Crawford, CRIM. JUST.,
Summer 2005, at 24.
6 There is substantial literature on Crawford. See Richard D. Friedman, The Confrontation
Clause Re-Rooted and Transformed, 2004 CATO Sup. CT. REV. 439; Chris Hutton, Sir Walter
Raleigh Revived: The Supreme Court Re-Vamps Two Decades of Confrontation Clause
Precedent in Crawford v. Washington, 50 S.D. L. REV. 41 (2004); Tom Lininger, Prosecuting
Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747 (2005); Miguel A. Mdndez, Essay, Crawford
v. Washington: A Critique, 57 STAN. L. REV. 569 (2004); Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v.
Washington: Encouraging and Ensuring the Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REV.
511 (2005) [hereinafter Mosteller, Confrontation]; Robert P. Mosteller, "Testimonial" and
the Formalistic Definition - The Case for an "Accusatorial" Fix, CRIM. JUST., Summer
2005, at 14.
7 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 23, Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36 (2004) (No. 02-9410)).
8 Id. at 51-52 (omission in original) (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346,365 (1992)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
9 Id. at 52 (quoting Brief for National Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amici
Curiae at 3, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (No. 02-9410)).
'0 See Hammon v. Indiana, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005) (discussing whether accusations
made to a responding officer are "testimonial"), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 552 (2005); Wash-
ington v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005) (discussing whether a 911 call is "testimonial"),
cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 547 (2005).
11 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69.
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A similar process, with the roles reversed, is occurring with defining the for-
feiture concept because it may override Crawford's prohibition on the admission of
testimonial statements by unavailable witnesses, however testimonial is defined.
The lower federal courts have articulated a narrower version of the rule over the last
thirty years. As embodied in case law, and as an evidentiary principle in Federal Rule
of Evidence 804(b)(6), the loss of constitutional and evidence-based objections under
the waiver doctrine requires proof that the defendant intended to prevent the witness
from testifying.'2 After Crawford, a broader version of the rule is gaining currency
in the courts. That version relies on a forfeiture rationale. The defendant loses any
confrontation rights if he is responsible in any way for the absence of the witness
at trial, regardless of his intent. 3 The Supreme Court has not faced the issue yet,
and the discussion in Crawford is scant. Justice Scalia mentioned "forfeiture" by
wrongdoing only to differentiate Crawford's reasoning from the reliability analysis
of Ohio v. Roberts14 and to say, in passing, that the majority accepted the "essentially
equitable" doctrine. 5 The only case cited, Reynolds v. United States, 6 relies princi-
pally on the defendant's deliberate concealment of the witness to justify the loss of his
right to confrontation. 17 As such, Reynolds is founded on waiver and is not a true "for-
feiture."
I put "forfeiture" in quotes because my research establishes that the doctrine,
as well as Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), are misnamed. The more appropriate
name is "waiver by wrongdoing." The English and American precedents, including
Reynolds v. United States, are all better understood as based on a waiver or implied
waiver rationale and are grounded in the long established rule that a defendant waives
his objections to hearsay statements when he deliberately keeps from testifying a
person expected to testify.' 8 This rule, founded on long established waiver principles,
12 See infra Part I.
'3 See infra Part II.
14 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
1 The complete statement is:
The Roberts test allows a jury to hear evidence, untested by the adver-
sary process, based on a mere judicial determination of reliability. It
thus replaces the constitutionally prescribed method of assessing relia-
bility with a wholly foreign one. In this respect, it is very different from
exceptions to the Confrontation Clause that make no claim to be a surro-
gate means of assessing reliability. For example, the rule of forfeiture by
wrongdoing (which we accept) extinguishes confrontation claims on es-
sentially equitable grounds; it does not purport to be an alternate means
of determining reliability.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158-59 (1879)).
16 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
'" See infra Part I.B and accompanying text.
'8 See infra Part I and accompanying text.
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reemerged in the last thirty years to counter witness intimidation by defendants. 1"
Prior to Crawford, the cases linked the loss of constitutional rights to proof that the
defendant deliberately acted to prevent testimony, which supported the inference
that the defendant implicitly waived the trial right to confront that witness. There
were scattered discussions that argued for a broader rule in the pre-Crawford cases
and some isolated commentary,20 but no court adopted a forfeiture rule,2' and several
courts specifically rejected it.22 Forfeiture does not appear in any of the formative
'9 The focus on witness intimidation is the consistent theme of the waiver by misconduct
rule found in the commentary, the minutes of the advisory committee drafting Federal Rule
of Evididence 804(b)(6), and the case law. The first to comment on the subject was Michael
H. Graham. MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, WITNESS INTIMIDATION: THE LAW'S RESPONSE 174-82
(1985). The advisory committee note to Federal Rule Evidence 804(b)(6) emphasized "the
need for a prophylactic rule to deal with abhorrent behavior 'which strikes at the heart of the
system ofjustice itself."' FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(6) advisory committee's note (quoting United
States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1204 (1984)).
The rule was developed by the federal courts and almost all the cases involved witness state-
ments in organized crime and drug prosecutions. See Flanagan, supra note 2; infra Part I.C
(identifying the declarants' participation in criminal activities).
20 See Friedman, Chutzpa, supra note 2, at 521-35 (arguing that statements of an absent
declarant should be admissible whenever the defendant is responsible for the unavailability
of the witness); Sykora, supra note 2, at 878-80 (arguing that intent to cause witness unavail-
ability should be eliminated from proposed rule 804(b)(6)).
21 See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 673 N.Y.S.2d 755,761-62 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (Peters,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the defendant-pastor's use of position of authority and provider
of counseling services to a child were responsible for the child's refusal to testify against him
in sexual misconduct case), affid, 711 N.E.2d 967 (N.Y. 1999); People v. Okafor, 495 N.Y.S.2d
895, 899 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (using the misconduct exception to admit prior statements
of decedent in rebuttal); Commonwealth v. Laich, 777 A.2d 1057, 1069 (Pa. 2001) (Castille,
J. dissenting) (arguing that the misconduct exception should apply to domestic homicide);
cf. State v. Hinson, No. M2000-02762-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 31202134, at *6 (Tenn. Crim.
App. Feb. 18, 2003) (interpreting TENN. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) to require intent to procure the
witness's unavailability).
22 Olson v. Green, 668 F.2d 421,430 (8th Cir. 1982) (stating that no case holds that parti-
cipation in a crime waives right to confront adverse witness and to do so would destroy the
right of confrontation), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1009 (1982); United States v. Benfield, 593
F.2d 815, 821 (8th Cir. 1979) (holding that an accessory who did not threaten the defendant
did not waive confrontation rights); Wyatt v. State, 981 P.2d 109, 115 n. 11 (Alaska 1999) (re-
cognizing that forfeiture by misconduct does not apply to domestic homicide where the homi-
cide was not committed for the purpose of preventing testimony); Laich, 777 A.2d at 1062 n.4
(rejecting misconduct exception in manslaughter prosecution); see also United States v. Jordan,
No. Crim. 04-CR-229-B, 2005 WL 513501, at *6 (D. Colo. Mar. 3, 2005) (stating that no FED.
R. EvID. 804(b)(6) case holds "that a murder whose by-product is the unavailability of a
witness.., is covered by the rule"); see also Kroger, supra note 2, at 854-57 (stating that
none of the federal courts considered and rejected an intent requirement); cf. State v. Jarzbek,
529 A.2d 1245, 1253 (Conn. 1987) (stating that "[tihe constitutional right of confrontation
would have little force, however, if we were to find an implied waiver of that right in every
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case law. It is first mentioned as a rationale in a footnote in a 1982 case stating,
without significant analysis or comparison, that forfeiture was a more appropriate
rationale than waiver. Forfeiture again appeared in the title to Federal Rule of Evidence
804(b)(6), again without detailed analysis, when twenty years of federal case law
on the topic was incorporated into that rule of evidence. In fact, the title of the rule
was changed from "waiver by wrongdoing" to "forfeiture by wrongdoing."23
In light of this history, to refer continually to this rule as "forfeiture" by wrong-
doing only emphasizes an inappropriate rationale for the doctrine - hence the use
of quotation marks around "forfeiture. 24 Terminology is important. It can create
a self-fulfilling prophecy. Since Crawford, the arguments in favor of a true forfeiture
theory have appeared.25 More important, courts have begun to use forfeiture in
some domestic homicide cases without requiring evidence of intent to prevent testi-
mony. 26 There is little discussion of the meaning of forfeiture or its logical conse-
quences in the recent case law, and one of the purposes of this Article is to fill the gap.
Part I introduces the topic and the issues and defines the critical terms of waiver
and forfeiture. Part II reviews the evolution of the doctrine of waiver by wrongdo-
ing and the promulgation of Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6) and establishes that
the courts have always required an intent to prevent testimony. Part I develops the
instance where the accused, in order to silence his victim, uttered threats during the commission
of the crime for which he is on trial."), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1061 (1988); State v. Hansen,
312 N.W.2d 96, 104-05 (Minn. 1981) (finding that a waiver based only on the declarant's
refusal to testify without proof of threats would destroy the Confrontation Clause in crimes
against the person); People v. Maher, 677 N.E.2d 728, 731 (N.Y. 1997) (holding that the
exception does not apply to murder unrelated to testimony); People v. Flowers, 667 N.Y.S.2d
546, 547 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (same).
23 See infra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
2 "Forfeiture" by wrongdoing or misconduct will be used when referring to the legal rule
expressed in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879), except when stating the formal
title of Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6) or when direct quotations require otherwise. For-
feiture, without quotes, refers to the legal rule that imposes a loss of rights without reference
to the mental state of the person subject to the forfeiture.
2 Friedman, supra note 6, at 466 (arguing that intent to prevent testimony is immaterial
because the defendant is responsible for the declarant's absence); Krischer, supra note 5, at
15-16 (arguing that the defendant's traumatizing the domestic violence victim is sufficient to
support forfeiture by wrongdoing). But see Lininger, supra note 6, at 811 n.278 (suggesting
that intent to prevent testimony should be required).
26 United States v. Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d 364, 370 (6th Cir. 2005) (adopting a true for-
feiture rationale); United States v. Mayhew, 380 F. Supp. 2d. 961 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (same);
People v. Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (admitting the statement of a
domestic homicide victim despite lack of evidence of intent to prevent testimony); People
v. Moore, 117 P.3d 1 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (same); State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789 (Kan. 2004)
(admitting a statement of the decedent without consideration of the defendant's intent to pre-
vent testimony); Gonzalez v. State 155 S.W.3d 603,610-11 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004) (specifically
rejecting a requirement of intent to prevent testimony).
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recent emergence of the forfeiture rationale and its post-Crawford expansion by
state courts. The history is remarkable for the lack of analysis or consideration of
other theories. Part IV examines the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the loss of
confrontation rights and concludes that the Court has not adopted the true forfeiture
rationale that is being advanced in the state courts. The often-cited examples of
forfeiture, in pleas and procedural defaults, are distinguishable from the forfeiture
theory advanced here because the former is a collateral and inevitable consequence
of trials and pleas. Part V identifies some of the problems that come from an essen-
tially unrestrained forfeiture theory. Part VI analyzes "essentially equitable" aspects
of the rule and finds that equitable considerations are consistent with a wavier anal-
ysis and inconsistent with a true forfeiture rationale. Part VII compares and contrasts
the waiver and forfeiture-based theories and concludes that forfeiture is too broad
a rationale and that waiver is more consistent with the history, precedent, and consti-
tutional jurisprudence on the relinquishment of confrontation rights. The Article
concludes with a short discussion of the difficult case of domestic homicide.
B. Choices and Consequences
The significance of a forfeiture-based rule cannot be overestimated. At the
least, it would create an unusually broad exception to the Confrontation Clause in
any case where there is any causal connection between the defendant and absence
of a witness. It potentially impacts every homicide case as well as any case where
the declarant is viewed as unavailable because of the trauma of the crime, as in do-
mestic violence and child abuse cases. One advocate has argued that forfeiture should
apply in almost all domestic violence cases.27 A true forfeiture standard would radi-
cally change the analysis the Court uses to determine when constitutional rights are
relinquished. The Supreme Court has always based the loss of constitutional rights
on a waiver analysis. The forfeiture of constitutional rights is justified only by the
interests of the state, which seems inconsistent with constitutional rights which are
specifically intended to require the state to follow proper procedures to obtain a
conviction. A forfeiture theory also undermines the redefined Confrontation Clause
in at least two ways. Crawford's central premise is that the Framers insisted on the
protection of having a witness testify in person before the defendant and admitted
hearsay only when the witness was unavailable and the hearsay had been subject to
cross-examination.28 The forfeiture rationale avoids this in a significant category
of cases and permits conviction without the presence of key witnesses.29 Moreover,
27 Krischer, supra note 5, at 14-15.
28 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
29 Cf. Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. PA. L.
REV. 1171 (2002) (arguing, before Crawford, that a testimonial approach to the Confrontation
Clause would properly limit the use of victimless prosecutions).
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courts may find it easier to decide the forfeiture issue than to wrestle with whether
the statement is "testimonial," avoiding more difficult issues of the scope and ap-
plicability of the Confrontation Clause. 3' A forfeiture doctrine also may have a pro-
found effect on whether other constitutional rights and procedural protections can be
lost by unintended conduct.
C. Defining the Terms
1. Waiver
The waiver in the wrongdoing cases can be an express waiver, but more often
it is an implied waiver.3' To use the traditional definition found in Johnson v. Zerbst,32
a waiver is "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privi-
lege. 33 The waiver standard looks to the defendant's knowledge of the right as well
as the deliberate intention to relinquish that right. The Zerbst standard is fully met
when the courts require the defendant to be informed of the rights involved, have
the capacity to make the decision, intend to forego those rights, and is asked on the re-
cord to forego the rights. 4 A guilty plea is the best example of the application of the
strict waiver standard.
Waiver in law is not limited to decisions that are deliberate, informed, and speci-
fically posed by the judicial process. Courts also find a waiver from a defendant's
acts.35 The actual knowledge and intention to relinquish a right are inferred from
30 Many of the post-Crawford cases avoided a testimonial issue by finding a forfeiture.
See, e.g., Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d at 370 (facing excited utterance as testimonial); People v.
Baca, No. E032929, 2004 WL 2750083, at *10 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 2,2004) (avoiding whether
the identification was testimonial); Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 847 (avoiding the issue of whether
casual statements to police are testimonial); People v. Jiles, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 790, 795 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2004) (avoiding the issue of a dying declaration as testimonial); Meeks, 88 P.3d at
793-94 (avoiding the issue of whether a response to a police question was testimonial); Gonzalez,
155 S.W.3d at 609 (avoiding the issue of whether statements to police were testimonial).
"1 Waiver has been the subject of substantial commentary, particularly in the context of
constitutional rights. See, e.g., Jessica Wilen Berg, Understanding Waiver, 40 HOUS. L. REv.
281 (2003); GeorgeE. Dix, Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brieffor More Careful Analysis,
55 TEx. L. REv. 193 (1977); David S. Kaplan & Lisa Dixon, Coerced Waiver and Coerced
Consent, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 941 (1997); Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 Nw. U.
L. REV. 801 (2003); Edward L. Rubin, Toward a General Theory of Waiver, 28 UCLA L. REV.
478 (1981); Ralph S. Spritzer, Criminal Waiver, Procedural Default and the Burger Court,
126 U. PA. L. REv. 473 (1978).
32 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
I ld. at 464.
4 See FED. R. CRiM. P. 11.
31 See Berg, supra note 31, at 283 (defining waiver as "any action or decision by an in-
dividual to give up a right that is currently functioning (for example, constitutional protections
in the Bill of Rights)" (footnotes omitted)); Rubin, supra note 31, at 481.
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the defendant's actions and the context in which they are taken. A defendant who
does not take the stand necessarily waives the right to testify when it is not used at
the appointed time. That act, on a key point of trial strategy, taken in consultation
with counsel, necessarily implies knowledge of the right to testify and a deliberate
decision to forego it. Similarly, a defendant who voluntarily absents himself from
the trial also waives his trial rights because the trial continues without him, and his
absence is an election or choice not to be in court and exercise the trial rights. The
exception to the rule against hearsay in Rule 804(b)(6) operates the same way.36
The waiver is dependent on proof that the defendant acted with knowledge of and,
in part, because of the victim's capability of testifying against him. Knowledge of
the right of confrontation and the intention to relinquish that specific right are infer-
red from the defendant's intentional act aimed at preventing a witness from testifying.
Intimidating a witness, rather than any other person, strongly supports the inference
that the actor did not intend to exercise or to rely upon the right of confrontation at
a possible or expected trial. The murder of a witness on the way to court to testify
supports a very strong inference of waiver,37 while a homicide alone does not sup-
port any such inference about trial rights. The murder does make it logically im-
possible for the victim to testify, but without more facts, there is nothing to connect
that crime with the trial or testimony and nothing to support the inference that the
act was a choice about trial rights.38
The inference of knowledge and intent is measured by an objective standard.
It cannot be avoided simply by a plausible claim that the party had neither know-
ledge of the right nor specific intent to waive it. George Reynolds apparently believed
that he had not waived his right to compel the government to produce his wife as
a witness against him.39 William Allen continually insisted that he wanted to be in
the courtroom, despite his disruptive behavior.4 A defendant may miss the trial with-
out necessarily agreeing to waive his rights to hear the witnesses testify. Neverthe-
less, the Court has held that the voluntary absence from trial necessarily means the
loss of those rights and that the consequences were so obvious that a specific warning
36 Cf. United States v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 950,961 n.5 (7th Cir. 2002) (describing FED.
R. EVID. 804(b)(6) as "really a waiver provision"), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1134 (2003).
37 United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 271 (2d Cir. 1982). The inference from
the action is particularly strong under these facts, but the central issue in the case was whether
the defendant, in custody at the time, could lose his rights even though he was not a partici-
pant in the murder.
38 United States v. Jordan, No. 04-CR-229-B, 2005 WL 513501, at *6 (D. Colo. Mar. 3,
2005) (finding that the decedent's statement that he was assaulted over drug debts provided
no evidence that the assault was meant to prevent testimony as required by FED. R. EVID.
804(b)(6)).
'9 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
40 Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 339-42 (1970).
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of the loss was not required.4' An objective standard is necessary, not only because
the defendant's subsequently expressed intent may be inherently suspect but also
because it is necessary for consistent application of the law.
That waivers may be implied using an objective standard does not mean that the
defendant's actual knowledge or intent is irrelevant. There must be evidence of what
the defendant did or said, or proof of the context in which he acted, to provide an ob-
jective basis for the court's legal conclusion that the defendant has relinquished his
rights. The essential aspect of waiver, even an implied waiver, is that the loss of rights
is dependent on the mental state of the defendant, not solely upon an arbitrary act iden-
tified by the state as triggering the loss of rights.
2. Forfeiture
A forfeiture is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as "[tihe loss of a right, pri-
vilege, or property because of a crime, breach of obligation, or neglect of duty."42 It
is an unforeseen and unintended consequence to the actor of another action.43 Forfei-
ture occurs by operation of law, regardless of the state of mind of the defendant."
In the context of constitutional rights, a forfeiture is justified only by the adverse con-
sequences to the state that flow from the triggering event.45 Here, the triggering
event is the homicide or intimidation of the victim. Proof that the defendant was re-
sponsible for the witness's absence is sufficient to eliminate any right of confrontation
under the Sixth Amendment. There are two broad arguments for forfeiture differing
only in whether the issue is viewed from the perspective of the government or of the
defendant. The former theory emphasizes the harm to the government, the court system
" Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 19-20 (1973).
42 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 677 (8th ed. 2004).
41 Peter Westen, Away from Waiver: A Rationale for the Forfeiture of Constitutional
Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1214, 1214-15 (1977) [hereinafter Westen,
Away from Waiver] (distinguishing between constitutional rights that may be unknowingly
forfeited by a guilty plea from constitutional rights that can only be deliberately waived).
This article sparked an exchange on the topic. See Stephen A. Saltzburg, Pleas of Guilty and
the Loss of Constitutional Rights: The Current Price of Pleading Guilty, 76 MICH. L. REV.
1265 (1978); Peter Westen, Forfeiture by Guilty Plea - A Reply, 76 MICH. L. REv. 1308
(1978); see also Tess, supra note 2, at 898-901 (discussing Westen's theory in the context
of waiver by misconduct).
" The irrelevance of intent or mental state is also present in civil forfeiture, an in rem
action against property allegedly involved in a criminal action. Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S.
442 (1996) (holding that there was no constitutional requirement for the innocent owner defense
to civil forfeiture). See generally David Benjamin Ross, Note, Civil Forfeiture: A Fiction that
Offends Due Process, 13 REGENT U. L. REv. 259 (2000).
45 Westen, Away from Waiver, supra note 43, at 1235-39 (arguing that some defenses are
forfeited by a guilty plea because the government has relied upon the plea and subsequent
assertion of the defenses would deprive the government of the ability to obtain a conviction).
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or society caused by the loss of testimony.46 The latter argues that the defendant
should not benefit from his criminal act. 47
Perhaps the best exposition of the forfeiture rationale applied to criminal defen-
dants was by the Iowa Supreme Court:
"The theory of the cases appears to be that the disclosure of rele-
vant information at a public trial is a paramount interest, and any
significant interference with that interest, other than by exercis-
ing a legal right to object at the trial itself, is a wrongful act."...
Thus, it is the fact that a defendant's conduct interferes with the
interest in having witnesses testify at a public trial that makes
the defendant's conduct wrongful. As a result, the nature of the
defendant's conduct is not as important as the effect of that con-
duct on the witness's willingness to testify at trial.48
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LosS BY MISCONDUCT DOcTRINE
A. English and American Antecedents
The early English and American antecedents of the "forfeiture" cases do not
specifically address the intention of the defendant, but the facts of the cases all
involve witnesses rather than victims and acts occurring after the witness had been
deposed or had testified - acts which are explained only by a desire to prevent
'4 See United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 652 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting United States
v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting that admission partly offsets the per-
petrator's rewards for misconduct)), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 897 (2001); White, 116 F.3d at 913
(noting "[t]he government should be no worse off' than if the victim-witness had not been
murdered), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 960 (1997); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1359
(8th Cir. 1976) (noting the defendant should not be permitted to subvert the judicial process
by witness intimidation), cert. deniedsub nom., Hofstad v. United States, 431 U.S. 914 (1977);
People v. Geraci, 649 N.E.2d 817, 821 n.2 (N.Y. 1995) (noting that witness intimidation jus-
tifies forfeiture of constitutional rights), cert. denied sub nom., Geraci v. Senkowski, 531 U.S.
1018 (2000).
"$ This rationale is found in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1879) and is
repeated in many confrontation loss cases. See, e.g, United States v. Gray, 405 F.3d 227,242
(4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 275 (2005); United States v. Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d
364,370 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1279 (1 st Cir. 1996), cert.
denied sub nom., Comer v. United States, 519 U.S. 1033 (1996); People v. Baca, No. E032929,
2004 WL 2750083, at *10 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 2,2004); State v. Olson, 291 N.W.2d 203,207
(Minn. 1980).
48 State v. Hallum, 606 N.W.2d 351,356 (Iowa 2000) (quoting Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d
1193, 1201 (6th Cir. 1982)).
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testimony. In Lord Morley's Case,49 the court held that if there was proof "that the
witness was detained by means or procurement of the prisoner, then the examination
might be read."50 The testimony was that the witness, Thomas Snell, disappeared
after telling his colleagues that "Lord Morley's Trial was to be shortly but he would
not be there."'" The motivation to disappear clearly was tied to the trial. The proof,
however, failed to show that Lord Morley was responsible for Snell' s absence, and
his deposition was not admitted.52 Similarly, less than thirty years later in Harrison's
Case, a statement to the coroner was read when there was proof that the witness was
spirited away by associates of Harrison.53 A witness testified that an apprentice,
Andrew Bowsell, had told him that he was intercepted on an errand by a man who
inquired whether Bowsell was to give evidence regarding Harrision and, upon answer-
ing yes, was offered money to be kind to Mr. Harrison.54 Bowsell' s master testified
that subsequently three soldiers came for Bowsell and took him away, and that one
returned the next day to retrieve his clothes, and that subsequent efforts to locate him
had failed.
A third case involving the waiver principle is the Proceedings in Parliament
Against Sir John Fenwick.56 Fenwick was indicted and arraigned for treason but de-
layed his trial by promising to confess all.57 In the interim, Goodman, one of the two
necessary witnesses in a treason trial, escaped with the help of Lady Fenwick. 58 A
bill of attainder was-then brought against Fenwick in Parliament. 59 All parties agreed
that Fenwick could not be tried at the Old Bailey without two live witnesses and
that Goodman's prior sworn statement could not be admitted against him at a trial ap-
parently because the acts of Lady Fenwick could not be attributed to her husband. 6
Nevertheless, Parliament, in its legislative capacity, heard Goodman's sworn state-
ment, voted the bill of attainder, and Lord Fenwick lost his head.6'
One late colonial case admitted the testimony of a witness who had been spirited
away by a friend of the defendant, with the defendant's knowledge, to prevent the
witness from testifying.62 The evidence texts available in the early nineteenth century
" 6 How. St. Tr. 770 (H.L. 1666) (Eng.).
50 Id. at771.
"' Id. at 777.
52 Id.
5' 12 How. St. Tr. 834, 851 (Old Bailey 1692) (Eng.).
- Id. at 851-52.
55 Id.
56 13 How. St. Tr. 538 (H.C. 1696) (Eng.).
17 Id. at 538-40.
58 Id. at 579.
19 Id. at 538.
60 Id. at 578-83.
61 Id. at 607-08, 758.
62 Rex v. Barber, 1 Root 76 (Conn. 1775).
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also discuss the rule in the context of the defendant preventing the witness from tes-
tifying at trial.6 3 An early case summarized the principle:
The books enumerate four cases only, in which the testimony of
a witness who has been examined in a former trial, between the
same parties, and where the point in issue was the same, may be
given in evidence, on a second trial, from the mouths of other
witnesses, who heard him give evidence: ... 4th. Where the Court
was satisfied that the witness had been kept away by the contriv-
ance of the opposite party.'
Thus, the early English and American cases that framed the rule involved post-
crime attempts by the defendant, or those acting on his behalf, to prevent the testi-
mony of the witness at a pending criminal proceeding. None of these cases or con-
temporary evidence texts remotely suggests that a murder victim's hearsay statements
could be admitted solely because the defendant's crime had the by-product of causing
his absence from a trial.
B. Reynolds and Its Progeny
Fittingly, the first Supreme Court decision to consider the Confrontation Clause
was the seminal "forfeiture" by wrongdoing case, although that term does not appear
in the opinion. Reynolds v. United States involved the defendant's second trial in
the Utah territory for bigamy.65 The defendant's second wife testified at the first trial,
but the prosecution was unable to subpoena her for the second trial because the defen-
dant, and others in his household, refused to reveal her location. 6 The prosecution
then offered, and the trial court admitted, the second wife's prior sworn testimony
from the first trial.67 Before the Supreme Court, Reynolds asserted a violation of his
63 See JOHN F. ARCHBOLD, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW RELATIVE TO PLEADING AND
EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES; WITH THE STATUTES, PRECEDENTS OF INDICTMENTS, &C. AND
THE EVIDENCE NECESSARY TO SUPPORT THEM 84-85 (1824) (noting that statements are
admitted when the witness "is kept away by the means or procurement of the prisoner"); 1
JOSEPH CHrITY, APRACTICALTREATISEONTHE CRIMINAL LAW 585-86 (Springfield, G.&C.
Merriam 1841) (1836) (stating the rule as when the witness is "kept away by the defendant's
contrivance"); THoMAs PEAKE, A COMPENDIUM OFTHE LAW OF EVIDENCE 64 (Phil., Abraham
Small 1824) (1812) (stating that depositions are admitted "where there is reason to believe
that the prisoner sent them away"); S. M. PHIL.IPPS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
275-77 (New York, Gould, Banks & Gould 1816) (stating the rule as when a witness "is kept
away by the means and contrivance of the prisoner").
6' Drayton v. Wells, 10 S.C.L. (1 Nott & McC.) 409 (S.C. Const. App. 1819).
65 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
66 Id. at 159-60.
67 Id. at 160.
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Sixth Amendment rights as well as the failure to lay the foundation for introducing
the prior testimony.6" The Supreme Court resolved the constitutional claim by citing
Lord Morley's Case and other cases that involved active efforts by the defendant
or others to prevent the witness from testifying at trial.69 The case merely applied
the well-accepted English and American principle that active participation in the
witness's absence allowed the admission of prior sworn testimony of that witness,
albeit in this case, over a Confrontation Clause objection.
The Reynolds opinion can only be read to apply to the acts of the defendant that
were intended to affect trial testimony. The key was the defendant's influence over
the witness. The Court always refers to her as a "witness," emphasizing that all par-
ties are acting in the context of a trial and the defendant's voluntary choice wrongly
to procure her absence from the court. 0
The Constitution gives the accused the right to a trial, at
which he should be confronted with the witnesses against him;
but if a witness is absent by his own wrongful procurement, he
cannot complain if competent evidence is admitted to supply the
place of that which he has kept away. The Constitution does not
guaranty an accused person against the legitimate consequences
of his own wrongful acts. It grants him the privilege of being con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; but if he voluntarily keeps
the witnesses away, he cannot insist on his privilege. If, there-
fore, when absent by his procurement, their evidence is supplied
in some lawful way, he is in no condition to assert that his consti-
tutional rights have been violated.7'
After discussing Lord Morley's Case and the other early English and American
precedents, the opinion restates the rationale. "The rule has its foundation in the
maxim that no one shall be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong; and,
68 Id. at 161.
6 The Court cited Lord Morley's Case and Harrison's Case. Also cited was a nineteenth
century English case, Regina v. Scaife, (1851) 117 Eng. Rep. 1271, 1272 (Q.B.) (holding that
witness's testimony before the magistrate could be admitted against Smith, who had kept her
away from the trial, but not against other defendants who were not implicated in witness tam-
pering). The American precedents were Wells, 10 S.C.L. 409, and Williams v. State, 19 Ga. 402
(1856).
70 Justice Scalia in Crawford based his testimonial analysis of the Sixth Amendment on
the term "witness." Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,51 (2004). The same logic applied
to Reynolds necessarily limits that case and its holding to actions voluntarily directed against
those who may testify.
7" Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 158.
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consequently, if there has not been, in legal contemplation, a wrong committed, the
way has not been opened for the introduction of the testimony."72
The opinion treats the various reiterations of the rule as equivalent. Having stated
the rule, Justice Waite then considered the evidence:
The testimony shows that the absent witness was the alleged
second wife of the accused; that she had testified on a former
trial for the same offense under another indictment; that she had
no home, except with the accused; that at some time before the
trial a subpoena had been issued for her, but by mistake she was
named as Mary Jane Schofield; that an officer who knew the
witness personally went to the house of the accused to serve the
subpoena, and on his arrival inquired for her, either by the name
of Mary Jane Schofield or Mrs. Reynolds; that he was told by the
accused she was not at home; that he then said, "Will you tell me
where she is?" that the reply was "No; that will be for you to find
out"; that the officer then remarked she was making himconsider-
able trouble, and that she would get into trouble herself; and the
accused replied, "Oh no; she won't, till the subpoena is served up-
on her[]" . . .
A second attempt to serve the subpoena under a different name was discussed, and
then the Court upheld the decision to admit the prior sworn testimony of the absent
declarant.74
In this we see no error. The accused was himself personally
present in court when the showing was made, and had full oppor-
tunity to account for the absence of the witness, if he would, or
to deny under oath that he had kept her away. Clearly, enough
had been proven to cast the burden upon him of showing that he
had not been instrumental in concealing or keeping the witness
away. Having the means of making the necessary explanation,
and having every inducement to do so if he would, the presump-
tion is that he considered it better to rely upon the weakness of
the case made against him than to attempt to develop the strength
of his own.75
72 Id. at 159.
71 Id. at 159-60.
74 Id. at 160.
75 Id.
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The Court's statement of the facts, particularly the last sentence, established an
express waiver. Reynolds certainly was aware that the witness would testify against
him because she had testified before. He did not provide her location, and more im-
portant, when provided the opportunity, did not offer any evidence that he was not
responsible for her absence from the courtroom. The opinion correctly viewed his
silence as an intentional, tactical choice to rely on a weak government case, rather
than an active defense that cross-examined the prosecution's witness. Nothing in the
opinion suggests that a true forfeiture of the right of confrontation was being consi-
dered. No statement remotely suggests that the defendant's responsibility for the wit-
ness's absence, in and of itself and without the context of expected testimony at the
trial, would have supported the loss of the right. To argue that Reynolds established
a true forfeiture is to ignore the facts that supported the decision and to eliminate all
references to the defendant's intentional acts to prevent his second wife from being
subpoenaed and forced to testify.
Reynolds was not an important precedent. The novel issue was not that the defen-
dant deliberately kept his wife from appearing and thereby waived the right to
confront her. The opinion made clear that this principle was already firmly estab-
lished.76 Rather, the important point was that prior trial testimony, subject to cross-
examination, could be admitted.77 After the point was clearly established in Mattox
v. United States,78 without reliance on any waiver analysis, Reynolds was of minor
importance and perhaps better known as a religious freedom case.7 9 The Court cited
it only five times before Crawford. The Court's subsequent cites to Reynolds estab-
lish that the holding was limited to cases where the defendant's knowing acts barred
his claim. The first citation of Reynolds by the Court occurred twelve years later in
a civil case upholding service of process on a corporate agent who was avoiding the
process server, obviously a case of knowing waiver of the traditional means of service
of process.80 The Court applied Reynolds in Motes v. United States,"' holding that
the testimony of an absent witness could not be admitted against a defendant who
had not procured the witness's absence. 2 However, Reynolds was cited in Diaz v.
United States8 3 to support the holding that the defendant's voluntary absence from
trial waived his Sixth Amendment right to be present at the trial. Two other cases
76 Id. at 158-59 (citing English and American cases and texts that provide that one inten-
tionally responsible for witness action waives objection to other testimony).
" As Justice Scalia pointed out in Crawford, some courts rejected the proposition that prior
testimony could be introduced, even if subject to prior cross-examination. Crawford v. Wash-
ington, 541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004).
78 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
7' Kroger, supra note 2, at 866 n.196.
8' Eureka Lake & Yuba Canal Co. v. Superior Court, 116 U.S. 410,418 (1886).
1 178 U.S. 458 (1900).
82 Id.
83 223 U.S. 442, 452 (1912).
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of that era merely recited the holding in general discussions of the admissibility of
prior swom statements.84 The two modem citations by the Court provide no support
for an expansive "forfeiture" interpretation because they concerned only the scope of
confrontation.85 Significantly, Reynolds was not mentioned in Snyder v. Massachu-
setts, when Justice Cardozo said that "[n]o doubt the privilege [of personally confront-
ing the witness] may be lost by consent or at times even by misconduct." 6 Nor was
it cited in Illinois v. Allen,87 which upheld the constitutionality of the forcible removal
of a disruptive defendant from the courtroom. The facts of Reynolds and its subsequent
citation in those six cases all limit it to its facts and did not create a true forfeiture rule.
C. The Modem Development of the Waiver by Wrongdoing Exception
What was originally described as waiver by misconduct but is now known as
"forfeiture" by wrongdoing began to emerge in 1976, principally in the federal courts,
to combat rising incidents of witness tampering found in drug and organized crime
cases.88 Initially, the federal courts used Federal Rule of Evidence 807, the residual
exception to the rule against hearsay, to admit the prior testimony of the intimidated
or dead witness. The federal courts addressed the Sixth Amendment issue by applying
Reynolds and held that intimidating the witness to prevent testimony waived any Sixth
Amendment rights to the admission of the witness's statements. The first modem feder-
al circuit court to use the defendant's wrongdoing against a witness to resolve a Con-
frontation Clause argument was United States v. Carlson,89 a typical witness intimida-
tion case. The witness purchased drugs from the defendant but immediately before
trial refused to testify despite having been granted immunity and subsequently having
been held in contempt for his persistent refusal to testify.' The witness told the DEA
agents that he feared reprisals but only indirectly implicated the defendant in the
threats.9 ' The trial court found that the witness was unavailable within the meaning
8 West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258, 265 (1904) (finding that Reynolds is not inconsistent
with upholding a defendant's convictions based upon testimony at a prior hearing at which
the defendant was present); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895) (reciting the
holding in Reynolds in a general discussion of the admissibility of prior sworn testimony of
now-deceased witnesses).
85 White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346,365 n.2 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citingReynolds
for the proposition that the right of confrontation applies only to formalized testimonial
evidence); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 179-80 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating
"early decisions that consider the confrontation right at any length all involved exparte tes-
timony submitted by deposition and affidavit.").
86 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934).
87 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
88 GRAHAM, supra note 19, at 172, 174-81 (describing the waiver doctrine).
89 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977).
90 Id. at 1352-53.
91 Id.
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of Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b) and that the requirements of the residual clause
were met, including proof of the "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. 92
The statements were found reliable because they were made before the grand jury
about an event in which the witness was personally involved and which he never re-
canted. 93 As to the right of confrontation, the court, citing Wigmore and other authori-
ties, held that a defendant should not be afforded the protection of the Confrontation
Clause when he silenced a witness.'
Carlson and others in the first wave of federal cases involved the residual clause,
and the courts made the finding that the hearsay statements had "equivalent circum-
stantial guarantees of trustworthiness" as those of the traditional exceptions. 95 Rather
quickly, however, the courts collapsed the evidentiary and constitutional questions
and asked only if the defendant was responsible for the witness's failure to testify.
The Tenth Circuit in United States v. Balano9 stated: "A valid waiver of the constitu-
tional right is afortiori a valid waiver of an objection under the rules of evidence." 97
Other circuits quickly adopted the Balano approach.98 A similar evolution occurred
in the state courts.99
By the early 1990s, there was a substantial body of federal and state case law
upholding the waiver of constitutional and evidentiary rights because of witness inti-
midation. The elements of the rule established in the case law are straightforward."°°
92 Id. at 1353-55.
9' Id. at 1354.
94 Id. at 1357-59.
9' United States v. Rouco, 765 F.2d 983,993-96 (11 th Cir. 1985); Steele v. Taylor, 684
F.2d 1193, 1199-1200 (6th Cir. 1982) (noting that the state court found 804(b)(5) satisfied);
United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131, 1134-36, 38 (4th Cir. 1978); Carlson, 547 F.2d at
1354-55 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5)); United States v. Mastrangelo, 533 F. Supp. 389,
391 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); cf. United States v. Thevis, 84 F.R.D. 57, 63-66 (N.D. Ga. 1979), affid.
on other grounds, 665 F.2d 616, 628-30 (5th Cir. 1982).
96 618 F.2d 624 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980).
9' Id. at 626.
98 United States v. Emery, 186 F.3d 921,926-27 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. White,
116 F.3d 903,911-12 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d. 1271, 1279-80
(lst Cir. 1996); United States v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v.
Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 272-73 (2d Cir. 1982).
99 See, e.g., Steele, 684 F.2d at 1199-1200 (noting an unreported Ohio Court of Appeals
opinion that admitted evidence because of threats); Devonshire v. United States, 691 A.2d
165, 166 (D.C. 1997); State v. Gettings, 769 P.2d 25 (Kan. 1989); State v. Magouirk, 539 So.
2d 50, 64-66 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (on rehearing 1989); State v. Black, 291 N.W.2d 208,
213-14 (Minn. 1980), overruled by State v. Jones, 556 N.W.2d 903 (Minn. 1996); State v.
Sheppard, 484 A.2d 1330 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984) (applying waiver by threats to over-
come the defendant's objections to use of video-taped testimony by a child witness); Holtzman
v. Hellenbrand, 460 N.Y.S.2d 591, 597 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
100 Flanagan, supra note 2, at 479-98 (discussing the elements and procedure used in the
federal courts).
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The declarant-witness must be unavailable because of wrongdoing done by the de-
fendant that was intended to and did procure the witness's absence.'0 ' Unavailabil-
ity is defined broadly and is consistent with the standards of Federal Rule of Evidence
804 and includes the declarant's refusal to testify in court.2 "Wrongdoing" may
be, but need not be, illegal conduct.0 3 The defendant does not have to be under in-
dictment or pending trial, and there is no requirement that the declarant be a scheduled
witness 4 or even be cooperating with the government at the time of the intimidation.0 5
The rule applies whenever the defendant acted against the declarant because of the
declarant' s potential to be a witness against the perpetrator. " The defendant's mis-
conduct must cause the declarant's unavailability at trial. A declarant's refusal to
testify for independent reasons prevents the rule's application to a defendant. In the
majority of cases, there existed direct proof of the defendant's participation, either by
orders, threats, or actual violence against the witness. 0 7 In a few cases, the defendant's
101 See, e.g., Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1279 (stating that "intent to deprive the prosecution of
testimony need not be the actor's sole motivation."); Aguiar, 975 F.2d at 47 (stating that the
test is whether the defendant "procures a witness's absence"); United States v. Potamitis, 739
F.2d 784, 788 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating a defendant waives the confrontation right "when his
own misconduct is responsible for a witness's unavailability at trial"); Rice v. Marshall, 709
F.2d 1100, 1101 (6th Cir. 1983) (stating the declarant was expected to be a witness against
the defendant), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1034 (1984); Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 271 (stating
the declarant was murdered on the way to testify); United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 630
(5th Cir. 1982) (stating that "a defendant who causes a witness to be unavailable for trial for
the purpose of preventing that witness from testifying also waives his right to
confrontation."); Steele, 684 F.2d at 1198-99 (stating that the defendant's wife was called
to testify); United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 628-29 (10th Cir. 1979) ("'[T]he law
[should not] permit an accused to subvert a criminal prosecution by causing witnesses, not
to testify at trial .... ' (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (quoting United States v.
Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1359 (8th Cir. 1976))); Carlson, 547 F.2d at 1358 (noting that the
defendant acted only when he learned that the declarant was going to testify at his trial); see
also United States v. Jordan, No. Crim. 04-CR-229-B, 2005 WL 513501, at * 6 (D. Colo.
Mar. 3, 2005) (stating that no FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(6) case holds that "a murder whose by-
product is the unavailability of a witness" is covered by the rule).
102 See, e.g., Steele, 684 F.2d at 1198-99 (refusal to testify after being held in contempt
and having the marital privilege denied); Carlson, 547 F.2d at 1353 (witness held in
contempt after refusal to testify).
103 United States v. Ochoa, 229 F.3d 631, 639 & n.3 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that giving
permission for telephone calls was not wrongdoing and declining to reach the question of
whether assisting a witness to leave town is misconduct); FED. R. EViD. 804(b)(6) Advisory
Committee Note ("[W]rongdoing need not consist of a criminal act.").
'04 United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 668 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that an ongoing
criminal proceeding in which the declarant was to testify is not required), cert. denied, 524
U.S. 905 (1998).
'05 See Crutchfield v. United States, 779 A.2d 307, 331-32 (D.C. 2001).
'06 See Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1279-81; Crutchfield, 779 A.2d at 332.
'07 See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 284 F.3d 758,763-65 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding repeated
conversations by the defendant and the declarant); United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635,
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responsibility was inferred from circumstantial evidence." 8 Finally, preventing the
testimony does not have to be the defendant's sole or even major motivation. The
element is satisfied if the defendant's desire to prevent the testimony was one reason
for the defendant's act against the victim."° These elements were used to resolve
the Confrontation Clause claims of defendants accused of making witnesses unavail-
able to testify at trial and consequently stated the constitutional standard applied in the
federal appellate and trial courts and state courts.
D. The Adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6)
The Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Evidence began considering the
adoption of a formal rule of evidence on the issue in 1992.'1° Two cases were par-
ticularly important."' First, the text of the Rule was grounded on United States v.
Thevis, 1 2 which identified two elements: "(1) the defendant caused the witness'
unavailability (2) for the purpose of preventing that witness from testifying at trial."" i3
The second case, United States v. Mastrangelo,11" raised the question of who, beyond
the direct perpetrators of the violence against the witness, would be subject to the
rule. 5 This case led the drafters to include those who "acquiesce" in the wrongdoing
against the witness." 6 The original draft of the rule was titled "waiver by miscon-
duct."" 7
657 (2d Cir. 2001) ('The record amply demonstrates that Dhinsa murdered Manmohan and
Satinderjit to 'depriv[e] the government of. . . potential witness[es]."' (alterations and
omission in original) (quoting Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1280)); United States v. Johnson, 219 F.3d
349, 352, 355 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding three witnesses observed the murder of the informant).
108 United States v. Mastrangelo, 561 F. Supp. 1114 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (inferring respon-
sibility from prior statements and an obvious motive to kill the only witness, even where the
defendant was in custody at the time of the murder), aff'd, 722 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 467 U.S. 1204 (1984); People v. Cotto, 642 N.Y.S.2d 790 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996)
(finding that threats were made by unidentified individuals, but only the defendant had motive
and knew that the informant was a scheduled witness and that he lived in the neighborhood),
affid, 699 N.E.2d 394 (N.Y. 1998).
"'o Dhinsa, 243 F.3d at 654; Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1279.
'11 See Flanagan, supra note 2, at 475-79; Birdsong, supra note 2, at 903-08.
"'. See Flanagan, supra note 2, at 476-77.
112 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1982).
"3 Id. at 633 n.17. See also Flanagan, supra note 2, at 477.
114 662 F.2d 946 (2d Cir. 1981) (denying an interlocutory appeal arguing that double
jeopardy prevented prosecution of Mastrangelo), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 973 (1982), on remand,
533 F. Supp. 389 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (ruling before trial that statements were admissible), rev'd
on other grounds, 693 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1982) (remanding for hearing on knowledge and
failure-to-warn standard), on remand, 561 F. Supp. 1114 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (ruling that evidence
supported waiver of hearsay and constitutional rights), affid, 722 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1204 (1984).
115 Flanagan, supra note 2, at 476.
116 Id. at 476-79.
"' Id. at 478.
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The drafters never questioned the intent element in the rule."' Records of the
committee make clear that the rule was limited to witness tampering cases. In fact,
the committee rejected a proposal that the rule refer to witness tampering because
it believed that the text made clear that the exception applied only when the object
was to procure the witness's absence.' ' The Advisory Committee note stated that
the rule "recognizes the need for a prophylactic rule to deal with abhorrent behavior
'which strikes at the heart of the system of justice itself,"' citing Mastrangelo, a
clear case of violence against a testifying witness. 2 ' Two changes were made.
"Wrongdoing" was substituted for "misconduct" because the former term was used
in Rule 804(a). '' More importantly, the rule's title was changed from "Waiver by
misconduct" to "Forfeiture by misconduct."' 22 Comments received after the initial
draft of the rule was published suggested the change represented a more appropriate
rationale.'23 Those comments were not detailed nor does it appear that there was
any significant discussion about the meaning or the consequences of the change.1
2 4
In the same comments, the drafts made clear that the specific intent to prevent the
witness from testifying was an essential element of the rule.
The rule as promulgated reads as follows:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the dec-
larant is unavailable as a witness:
(6) Forfeiture by Wrongdoing. A statement offered against
a party that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was
intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant
as a witness. 2
5
1I There was little discussion of intent by the commentators. One argued for compliance
with all three elements of the Zerbst test, including the intent element for waiver. Kroger,
supra note 2, at 870-81. Another author argued against an intent element because the expanded
scope of the rule would reach domestic cases. Sykora, supra note 2, at 879-81.
"9 Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting of April 22, 1996, available
athttp://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/ev4-2296.htm (last visited Feb. 5,2006) [hereinafter
Minutes of the Meeting] (quoting Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 273).
120 FED. R. EviD. 804(b)(6) advisory committee's note (quoting Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at
273).
121 Flanagan, supra note 2, at 479.
122 Id. at 478.
123 See Minutes of the Meeting, supra note 119.
124 The public comments on the draft rule were perfunctory: Professor Myrna S. Raeder,
on behalf of ten professors of evidence made a one-sentence statement on this issue which
merely repeated part of the footnote in Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1201 n.8 (6th Cir.
1982). 2 MCCORMICK, TREATISE ON EVIDENCE app. A (5th ed. 1999) ("'Forfeiture' should be
substituted for 'waiver' because the concept of knowing waiver in this context is a fiction.").
Two other commentators made shorter statements to the same effect. Id.
121 FED. R. EviD. 804(b)(6).
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The developments in the states paralleled the federal rule. Several jurisdictions
promulgated a comparable rule'26 or adopted it by judicial decision.' 27 Signifi-
cantly, all of these pre-Crawford formulations had a specific intent requirement.' 21
The history and precedents of the "forfeiture" rule from seventeenth-century
England to the date that Crawford was decided, all focused on witness tampering
and all included an intent requirement. The rationale was waiver and not forfeiture.
The modem cases used waiver to resolve the evidentiary and constitutional objections
to the hearsay. When Justice Scalia noted that the majority approved of "forfeiture
by misconduct," he could only have been referring to the overwhelming prior case
law, state and federal, that included a specific intent requirement. Only after Crawford
did case law appear extending the rule beyond the precedents to include a true for-
feiture. 29
126 MIL. R. EvID. 804(b)(6); UNiF. R. EvID. 804(b)(5); CAL. EvID. CODE § 1350; DEL. R.
EviD. 804(b)(6); HAw. R. EVID. 804(b)(7); MICH. R. EVID. 804(b)(6); N.D. R. EviD. 804(b)(6);
OHIO R. EVID. 804(B)(6); PA. R. EVID. 804(b)(6); TENN. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) (deleting "acquies-
cence"). The governor of Maryland proposed a comparable provision in 2004, but it was not adop-
ted. See Letter from the Editor-in-Chief, 35 U. BALT. L.F. 4 (2004); Paul W. Grimm & Jerome
E. Deise, Jr., Hearsay, Confrontation, and Forfeiture by Wrongdoing: Crawford v. Washington,
A Reassessment of the Confrontation Clause, 35 U. BALT. L.F. 6, 6, 41 (2004).
127 Steele, 684 F.2d at 1199-1200 (noting an unreported Ohio Court of Appeals opinion
that admitted evidence because of threats); State v. Valencia, 924 P.2d 497 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1996); Devonshire v. United States, 691 A.2d 165 (D.C. 1997); State v. Hallum, 606 N.W.2d
351 (Iowa 2000); State v. Gettings, 769 P.2d 25 (Kan. 1989); State v. Magouirk, 539 So. 2d
50,64-66 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (on rehearing 1989); State v. Black, 291 N.W.2d 208,213-14
(Minn. 1980); State v. Sheppard, 484 A.2d 1330 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984) (applying
waiver by threats to overcome the defendant's objections to use of videotaped testimony by
child witness); Holtzman v. Hellenbrand, 460 N.Y.S.2d 591,597-98 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
128 Oregon recently amended its version of the evidence rule to delete the intent requirement
when the party caused the witness's unavailability by criminal conduct. The new provisions
defining "unavailability as a witness" read:
(f) A statement offered against a party who intentionally or knowingly engaged
in criminal conduct that directly caused the death of the declarant, or directly
caused the declarant to become unavailable as a witness because of incapacity
or incompetence.
(g) A statement offered against a party who engaged in, directed or otherwise
participated in wrongful conduct that was intended to cause the declarant to be
unavailable as a witness, and did cause the declarant to be unavailable.
OR. REV. STAT. § 40.465 (2005).
129 There are a few cases, taken in isolation, that may be viewed as supporting a true for-
feiture theory. For example, one court held that a defendant's slaying of a government agent
in an exchange of gunfire during a bungled arrest was sufficient to avoid a Confrontation
Clause claim. United States v. Rouco, 765 F.2d 983 (11 th Cir. 1985). Interestingly, the court
described it as a waiver of his right of confrontation. Id. at 995. There are also cases that speak
of forfeiture without mentioning intent to prevent testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Emery,
186 F.3d 921, 926 (8th Cir. 1999) (convicting the defendant of intentionally tampering with
the declarant/witness under the federal witness tampering statute).
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II. THE ORIGINS OF THE FORFEITURE RATIONALE
A. The Footnote
The facts of Reynolds and the case law that led to the promulgation of Rule
804(b)(6), and the evidence rule itself, are not promising sources for arguing that
responsibility, although unintended, for the witness's absence is enough to lose the
right to confrontation. Whenever a strict liability approach was raised, it was rejected.130
Nevertheless, the forfeiture argument has emerged from these cases. My explanation
for this anomaly is, to use the words of Justice Cardozo, "the tyranny of labels."''
The forfeiture rationale became associated with the confrontation waiver rule rather
early in its modem development. Forfeiture, with its connotation of a penalty, is inhe-
rently attractive because the loss of rights follows from wrongdoing, and in most
cases, the wrongdoing is violent and often fatal. Moreover, it is an easy doctrine to
apply, requiring only proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant
was responsible for the witness's unavailability to testify.
Forfeiture was first suggested as a rationale in the 1982 opinion Steele v. Taylor,132
an early misconduct case. The witness, defendant Owen Kilbane's common-law
wife or paramour (depending on one's view of the facts), 133 overheard conversations
among the defendants accused of a murder for hire."3 She refused to testify at the
murder trial and the trial court found that her decision was attributable to the husband's
improper influence over the witness. ' The court identified two theories to support
the loss of the hearsay objection and the right of confrontation. The loss was based
on "either a concept of implicit waiver of confrontation or the principle that a person
should not profit by his own wrong ....,36 The latter comes directly from Reynolds,
where the Court said, "The rule has its foundation in the maxim that no one shall
be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong.' '137 In footnote 8, the Steele major-
ity explained its preference for the forfeiture theory:
130 See supra notes 21-22.
131 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 114 (1934).
132 684 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1982).
133 The witness, Ms. Braun, was a prostitute living with Owen Kilbane when she overheard
him and others planning a murder for hire in 1968. Id. at 1197. Seven years later she left
Kilbane and reported the conversations to the police. Id. At the time of the trial, she was
reunited and living with the defendant and recently had given birth. Id. at 1198. The trial
court rejected self-incrimination and husband-wife privilege claims and ordered her to testify.
Id. The close personal relationship between the two was insufficient to support the claim of
common-law marriage, but, somewhat inconsistently, the same factors were used to conclude
that she was under his influence. Id. at 1199, 1208.
4 Id. at 1197.
13 Id. at 1199.
136 Id. at 1201 (footnote omitted).
137 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 159 (1878).
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It should be noted that the "waiver" concept is not applica-
ble, strictly speaking, to procurement [of a witness's unavaila-
bility], and its use is somewhat confusing. It is a legal fiction to say
that a person who interferes with a witness thereby knowingly,
intelligently and deliberately relinquishes his right to exclude hear-
say. He simply does a wrongful act that has legal consequences
that he may or may not foresee. The connection between the de-
fendant' s conduct and its legal consequence under the confronta-
tion clause is supplied by the law and not by a purposeful decision
by the defendant to forego a known constitutional right. But see
United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1982) holding that
procurement of witness unavailability is a "waiver question.1 38
The court went astray in the comparison of the alternatives. In the main text,
the court recognized implied waiver as one of two theories supporting the loss of
confrontation. In the footnote, however, the court used the Zerbst standard for an
actual waiver, which requires a knowing, intelligent waiver. Finding that "strictly
speaking," the standard for an actual waiver was not met, the court defaulted to the
forfeiture rationale but also noted that the Fifth Circuit disagreed with that conclusion.
The footnote was not a careful analysis of the issue and did not consider implied
waiver founded on intentional conduct toward a testifying witness. The court, how-
ever, also noted that the rule was based on "protecting the integrity of the adversary
process by deterring litigants from acting on strong incentives to prevent the testi-
mony of an adverse witness," 139 which emphasizes its relationship to witness tamper-
ing. At the same time, the court stated, "The rule is also based on a principle of reci-
procity similar to the equitable doctrine of 'clean hands.""'  The facts, of course,
were not a forfeiture, but an implied, if not express, waiver. The defendant paid for
the witness's counsel, and in fact, his counsel acted as her co-counsel, until forced
to withdraw by the court. 4 ' Counsel for the defendant also objected to the govern-
ment's request for protective custody and further raised the marital privilege as a
basis for the refusal to testify.142 It was clear that the defendant deliberately adopted
a trial strategy aimed at keeping her from the stand and that he did not want to cross-
examine her.
138 684 F.2d at 1201 n.8.
9 Id. at 1202.
140 id.
141 Id. at 1198.
142 Id. at 1198-99.
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After Steele, some courts referred to the forfeiture language, '43 while others read
Steele as a waiver case.' Waiver or forfeiture appeared in the opinions seemingly
at random and without much analysis or justification and sometimes interchange-
ably.'45 Nonetheless, the "forfeiture" rationale gained prominence in the opinions
from repetition, although the courts consistently applied the rule only when there
was evidence that the defendant intended to prevent the witness's testimony. A se-
cond reason for the ready acceptance of the "forfeiture" rationale, rather than waiver,
was that the courts tended to quote the language in Reynolds that the defendant should
not be permitted to benefit from his own wrong.'" Freed from the constraints of the
facts of Reynolds and read broadly, the maxim makes no reference to intent or to the
mental state of the defendant and eliminates it by omission. Moreover, it has strong
tones of public policy emphasizing the interests of the state.
The same process occurred in the states. State courts adopting the confrontation
waiver rule also found evidence of intent to prevent testimony.'47 Several states adopted
the language of the federal rule requiring intent. 148 At the same time, forfeiture was
also mentioned in the cases. For example, the Supreme Court of Iowa found that
the defendant intended to prevent his brother from testifying but concluded that it
was a forfeiture, rather than waiver, because the principle was based on the defendant's
wrongdoing, not on intentional relinquishment of a known right.'49 A similar evo-
lution in terms occurred during the drafting of Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6).
"' United States v. Rivera, 292 F. Supp. 2d 827, 830 (E.D. Va. 2003), aff'd, 412 F.3d 562
(4th Cir. 2005) (upholding the district court's determination that the defendant acquiesced
in the murder to prevent the witness from testifying); United States v. Houlihan, 887 F. Supp.
352, 358 & n. 10 (D. Mass. 1995) (referring to other cases finding waiver); Devonshire v.
United States, 691 A.2d 165, 169 (D.C. 1997); State v. Hallum, 606 N.W.2d 351, 355 (Iowa
2000); People v. Geraci, 649 N.E.2d 817, 821 (N.Y. 1995).
1" United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 815 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Gomez-
Lemos, 939 F.2d 326,334 n.3 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. White, 838 F. Supp. 618,621
(D.D.C. 1993), aff'd, 116 F.3d 903,911-12 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (referring to the forfeiture prin-
ciple); Devonshire, 691 A.2d at 169.
145 See United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d. 635, 650-52 (2d Cir. 2001) (discussing the
waiver-by-misconduct doctrine forfeiting confrontation rights); Black v. Woods, 651 F.2d
528, 531-32 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1358 n.ll (8th Cir.
1976) (stating "the question in all waiver cases is whether the defendant forfeited his right to
confront his accusers personally."); State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789, 794 (Kan. 2004) (speaking
of forfeiture of confrontation rights but waiver of evidence objection to the same hearsay).
14" Dhinsa, 243 F.3d. at 652; Cherry, 217 F.3d at 815; United States v. Mastrangelo, 693
F.2d 269, 272 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 629 (10th Cir. 1979);
Houlihan, 92 F.3d. at 1279; Hallum, 606 N.W.2d at 355.
147 See, e.g., State v. Valencia, 924 P.2d 497,504 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) (approving the trial
court's reasoning that the pattern of intimidation of the witness was sufficient to support a con-
frontation waiver).
148 See supra note 126.
149 Hallum, 606 N.W.2d at 354-56.
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The first title to the draft rule was "Waiver by misconduct,"'' 0 but the drafters later
changed it to "Forfeiture by misconduct" without any discussion of eliminating the
intent requirement in the rule of evidence. 5'
The pre-Crawford development of the rule reveals an odd dichotomy. The courts,
in fact, applied the rule only when the defendant intended to, and did, tamper with
an actual or potential witness'52 so that there was sufficient proof of an implicit waiver
of the constitutional right. While many, if not most, cases viewed the rule as founded
on waiver principles, the maxim of depriving the defendant of his confrontation right
as an ill-gotten benefit of his wrongdoing was equally prominent. Although some
courts gave reasons for selecting forfeiture, generally based on quotes from Reynolds,
there were no discussions about the differences between waiver and forfeiture and
there was no analysis of either option.
B. The Post-Crawford Cases and Their Analysis of the "Forfeiture" Rule
Crawford reshaped the confrontation landscape. Now testimonial evidence that
previously had been admitted under "firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions, or that met
comparable reliability standards, was inadmissible unless the defendant had the oppor-
tunity to cross-examine the witness. The ruling immediately affected domestic ho-
micide prosecutions, and the response was to focus on the forfeiture rationale which
could eliminate the need for evidence of witness tampering and broaden the scope
of the rule to all homicide cases.
The first post-Crawford case was State v. Meeks, 5 3 decided six weeks after Craw-
ford. Meeks shot James Green after an argument escalated into a fist fight and then
homicide.'54 The state introduced the victim's statement identifying the defendant
150 Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting of May 4-5, 1995, available
at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/min-ev5.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2006).
1'1 See supra notes 122-24.
152 See, e.g., United States v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating that the test
is whether the defendant procures a witness's absence); United States v. Potamitis, 739 F.2d
784, 788 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating a defendant waives the confrontation right "when his own
misconduct is responsible for a witness's unavailability at trial"); Rice v. Marshall, 709 F.2d
1100, 1101 (6th Cir. 1983) (stating the declarant was expected to be a witness against the
defendant); United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 271 (2d Cir. 1982) (stating the
declarant was murdered on the way to testify); Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1198-99 (6th
Cir. 1982) (stating that the defendant's common-law wife was called to testify); United States
v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 629 (10th Cir. 1979) ("'[T]he law [should not] permit an accused
to subvert a criminal prosecution by causing witnesses not to testify at trial ....' (emphasis
added) (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1359 (8th
Cir. 1976))); Carlson, 547 F.2d at 1358 (noting that the defendant acted only when he
learned that the declarant was going to testify at his trial).
5 88 P.3d 789 (Kan. 2004).
's Id. at 791.
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to an officer at the scene.' The court treated the issue as governed by its earlier
precedent, State v. Gettings, where the court had ruled that the defendant in a burglary
prosecution had waived his right of confrontation by murdering an eyewitness to the
burglary and arson. 56 The court simply extended that precedent to Meeks, in which
the defendant was on trial for the crime that made the witness unavailable. 157
Meeks has been cited by subsequent cases as supporting the admission of state-
ments without evidence that the defendant intended to prevent the witness from testi-
fying. 58 This is surprising because the Kansas Supreme Court neither addressed the
role of intent to procure the witness's absence nor analyzed the difference between
the waiver and forfeiture theories nor explicitly ruled on that issue.'59 In fact, the pre-
cedent and language of the opinion are a mixture of both theories. Gettings was a ty-
pical murder of a witness implicating the defendant in another crime with substantial
evidence that the victim was murdered to prevent the testimony. 60 Gettings, in turn,
relied on an earlier Kansas case, State v. Corrigan,'6' with facts similar to Reynolds.
Corrigan's wife told investigators that he had committed insurance fraud. 162 She
had left the defendant and been induced by threats to return to him, and then she
disappeared before the trial in circumstances that clearly indicated that Corrigan
"' Id. at 792.
156 769 P.2d 25, 27 (Kan. 1989).
17 Meeks, 88 P.3d 789. The extension of the rule to admit the absent declarant's state-
ments in a witness tampering or murder case was not a significant development. Many courts
already had permitted it. See, e.g., United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 814 (2d Cir. 1994)
(murder as part of extortion); United States v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir. 1992) (cons-
piracy to import heroin and witness tampering); United States v. Houlihan, 887 F. Supp. 352,
355-56 (D. Mass. 1995) (drug conspiracy and murder in furtherance of racketeering), aff'd,
92 F.3d 1271 (1st Cir. 1996); see also United States v. White, 838 F. Supp. 618,625 (D.D.C.
1993) (holding the declarant's statement admissible as if the declarant was testifying in court),
affd, 116 F.3d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 960 (1997). Moreover, in those
cases the jury would be aware of the reasons for the declarant's absence. When the hearsay
is admitted in a case unrelated to witness tampering, the court may face the issue of whether to
inform the jury of the reason for the unavailability of the witness. At least initially, it appears
that the reason would be irrelevant and prejudicial so that the better practice would be to
admit the hearsay without explaining why the witness is unavailable. See, e.g., United States v.
Mayhew, 380 F. Supp. 2d 961, 968 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (noting that the jury would not learn
that the judge admitted testimony because of the defendant's acts toward the witness).
158 People v. Taylor, No. A095412, 2005 WL 715973, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2005);
People v. Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843, 848 (Cal Ct. App. 2004); People v. Baca, No. E032929,
2004 WL 2750083, at *10 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 2,2004); People v. Moore, 117 P.3d 1, 5 (Colo.
Ct. App. 2004); Gonzalez v. State, 155 S.W.3d 603, 611 n.6 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004).
159 Meeks, 88 P.3d 789.
160 Gettings, 769 P.2d at 27-28.
161 691 P.2d 1311 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984).
162 Id. at 1313.
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knew where she was living because he had received recent information about his
children.' 63 The facts in both cases established the intent to prevent testimony.
Moreover, the principal precedent in Gettings was United States v. Thevis, 64
the Fifth Circuit opinion that specifically required proof that the defendant intended
to prevent testimony.'65 Thus, the facts and the supporting case law had an intent
requirement. At the same time, the opinions in Meeks and Gettings relied on the
maxim that "'[t]he law simply cannot countenance a defendant deriving benefits from
murdering the chief witness against him.""' The distinction between forfeiture and
waiver was not relevant to the court. In Meeks, the court continually referred to the
defendant's waiver of confrontation, although it concluded by applying different terms
to the evidentiary and constitutional grounds: "Meeksforfeited his right of confron-
tation and waived any hearsay objections. Green's statement was properly admitted."' 67
Meeks is not a reasoned analysis of the forfeiture rationale, nor did the court clearly
adopt it. The cited precedents all had evidence of the intent to intimidate or prevent
the witness from testifying. Significantly, the Kansas Court of Appeals does not believe
that Meeks requires a true forfeiture. 68 That court subsequently listed intent to
prevent testimony as an element of the rule.'69
The other post-Crawford opinions did not discuss the issue of intent to prevent
testimony. In People v. Moore, the Colorado Court of Appeals admitted the victim-
wife's statement in a domestic homicide case without mentioning or considering the
intent issue. 170 The only discussion of the doctrine was a citation to Crawford's ap-
proval of forfeiture by wrongdoing and a recitation that the defendant should not be-
nefit from his wrongdoing. 171
The California Court of Appeals for the Second District did discuss the issue in
People v. Giles, 72 a domestic homicide case where it was conceded that there was
no evidence that the defendant killed the victim to prevent her testimony.' The de-
fendant argued that such proof was required, and the court noted that the defendant's
principal precedent, United States v. Houlihan, supported his position, as did Federal
Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), but the court peremptorily rejected the argument. ' 74
163 Id. at 1316.
164 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1982).
165 Id. at 633 n.17.
"6 State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 189,794 (Kan. 2004) (quoting State v. Gettings, 769 P.2d 25,
28 (Kan. 1989)); Gettings, 769 P.2d at 28 (quoting Thevis, 665 F.2d at 630).
167 88 P.3d at 795 (emphasis added).
168 See State v. Henderson, 129 P.3d 646, 654 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006).
169 Id.
170 117 P.3d 1, 5 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004).
171 id.
172 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), cert. granted, 102 P.3d 930 (Cal. 2004).
173 Id. at 848.
174 Id. at 848 & n.3.
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Although the [Houlihan] opinion contains language suggesting
that a killing must be motivated by a desire to silence the victim
to trigger a forfeiture of the right to confrontation, we see no
reason why the doctrine should be limited to such cases. Forfei-
ture is a logical extension of the equitable principle that no person
should benefit from his own wrongful acts. A defendant whose
intentional criminal act renders a witness unavailable for trial
benefits from his crime if he can use the witness's unavailability
to exclude damaging hearsay statements by the witness that would
otherwise be admissible. This is so whether or not the defendant
specifically intended to prevent the witness from testifying at
the time he committed the act that rendered the witness unavail-
able. Other courts have applied forfeiture in cases where the defen-
dant is charged with the same homicide that rendered the witness
unavailable, rather than with some underlying crime about which
the victim was going to testify.'75
Again, there is no significant analysis of the reasons for the intent to prevent tes-
timony, but rather an acceptance of the argument that a defendant should not benefit
from wrongdoing. This is particularly interesting because California Evidence Code
section 1350 mirrors Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), and provides that the state-
ment of an unavailable declarant is admissible if
[t]here is clear and convincing evidence that the declarant's un-
availability was knowingly caused by, aided by, or solicited by
the party against whom the statement is offered for the purpose of
preventing the arrest or prosecution of the party and is the result
of the death by homicide or the kidnapping of the declarant. 7 6
Thus, there was an indication that the legislature intended a narrower application
of the rule of evidence.' The court did place some restrictions on it, holding that
175 Id. at 848.
176 CAL. EviD. CODE § 1350(a)(1). The court was aware of this provision but did not discuss
it, although it did note that it was not subject to the constraints of an evidence rule comparable
to Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6). Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 848 n.3.
... California Evidence Code section 1350 is an evidence provision, as is Federal Rule of
Evidence 804(b)(6), and the issue is the constitutional standard for the waiver of the right to
confrontation. Nevertheless, these rules of evidence are important. The same standards found
in those rules initially were developed to address the constitutional claims, and then they were
used to resolve evidence issues before being promulgated as rules of evidence. See supra notes
88-99 and accompanying text. In this case, the constitutional standard became the rules of evi-
dence, and the latter are relevant precisely because they state the constitutional standard used
by the federal appellate and trial courts, at least until Crawford's ambiguous reference to the
doctrine.
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the forfeiture of the right of confrontation did not automatically waive an otherwise
applicable evidence objection, that the defendant's criminal act resulting in the un-
availability of the witness must be intentional, that forfeiture as an equitable doc-
trine should not be applied when it would be inequitable, and that the jury should
not be advised of the court's finding of an intentional act.' The Court of Appeals
of Texas also adopted the forfeiture rationale in Gonzalez v. State. '79 The Texas court's
opinion on the issue of intent simply adopted the reasoning in People v. Giles.'80
A federal circuit court has recently adopted a true forfeiture rationale,' and other
courts have followed its lead. 8 2 The trend is not universal. Other post-Crawford
decisions have not adopted the forfeiture rationale. I8 3
The commentators also are beginning to examine whether the intent to prevent
testimony is necessary to apply the "forfeiture" doctrine. One recent article by a Cali-
fornia Superior Court judge primarily views the issue from its equity origins. The
author concludes that the loss of constitutional and hearsay objections is a remedial res-
ponse to deliberate wrongdoing. Thus, equity and the history of the doctrine require
intent to prevent testimony.8
4
Another argues that a true forfeiture should be applied regardless of the defen-
dant's motive because there is no principled way to limit it to witness tampering
cases. ' The argument that the intent requirement limiting the doctrine to witness
tampering cases is unprincipled is, in my view, fatally flawed. Only one hypothetical
17 Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 850-51. See Joan Comparet-Cassani, Crawford and the For-
feiture by Wrongdoing Exception, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1185, 1202-05 (2005) (criticizing
the Giles court's restrictions as ineffective).
179 155 S.W.3d 603 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004).
s0 ld. at 6 10-11.
's United States v. Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d 364,370-71 (6th Cir. 2005). The opinion noted
that Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6) did include an intent requirement, but rejected intent
because rules of evidence do not determine constitutional standards. Id. at 370. This argument,
however, ignores the fact that the same standard was used to resolve constitutional claims for
the last thirty years. See supra notes 88-99, 176 and accompanying text.
i82 People v. Bauder, 269 Mich. App. 174 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005).
183 State v. Wiggins, No. 99-CRS-46567, 2005 WL 857109, at *2,4 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar.
18, 2005) (finding no motive to prevent testimony, but the error, if any, was harmless); Com-
monwealth v. Edwards, 830 N.E.2d 158, 170 (Mass. 2005) (holding intent to prevent testimony
a requirement); People v. Baca, No. E032929, 2004 WL 2750083, at * 10-12 & n.6 (Cal. Ct.
App. Dec. 2, 2004) (finding intent to prevent testimony but questioning the requirement);
State v. Wright, 701 N.W.2d 802,814-15 (Minn. 2005) (requiring intent to prevent testimony);
State v. Fields, 679 N.W.2d 341, 347 (Minn. 2004) (finding intent to prevent testimony).
's Comparet-Cassani, supra note 178, at 1188-89, 1206-08 (2005).
185 Joshua Deahl, Note, Expanding Forfeiture Without Sacrificing Confrontation After
Crawford, 104 MICH. L. REV. 599 (2005). The note is largely devoted to arguing that the
forfeiture doctrine should be used in cases in which the defendant is charged with the
criminal act that made the witness unavailable, that is the so-called reflexive application of
the doctrine. The courts have had little difficulty on this point. See supra note 157.
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is posed and it assumes that a defendant would lose the right of confrontation when
he kills a witness to prevent the witness from cooperating with the police, but would
retain the right to confrontation if he killed the same witness in revenge for cooper-
ating with the police after being told not to do so.'8 6 In fact, it is the defendant's
objective intent, not his subjective intent, that controls.8 7 Courts have easily found
that a murder in those circumstances was committed, at least in part, to prevent testi-
mony.188 The declarant's testimony would be admitted in both cases, and the false
conflict disappears. The student note also ignores that intent has been a significant re-
quirement of confrontation waiver from the beginning.'89 A comparison of a true
witness tampering case, with that of domestic homicide, clearly shows the signi-
ficant and principled factual differences. Witness tampering is intended to undermine
the proof available to the government, and the act establishes the intent to forgo the
trial right of confrontation. The latter, committed without a connection to expected tes-
timony, supports no inference about trial rights. Moreover, the primary factor in cons-
titutional analysis is the Supreme Court' sjurisprudence on the relinquishment of consti-
tutional rights, including confrontation. Recent commentary has not addressed this
issue. The next section develops more fully the thesis that the Court has always
relied on a waiver analysis, and has always required proof of intent to forgo a cons-
titutional right. Thus, history, precedent, and constitutional analysis require express
or implied intent.
Ill. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE Loss OF CONFRONTATION RIGHTS
A. The Supreme Court Analyzes the Loss of Confrontation Rights as a Waiver
The right of confrontation may be relinquished, and the Court has consistently
required that it be waived. The traditional definition of waiver found in Johnson
186 Deahl, supra note 185, at 609.
187 See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
188 See United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1279-80 (1st Cir. 1996) (finding
forfeiture when the defendant, leader of a drug conspiracy with strict rules against talking to
police, killed the declarant co-conspirator after learning that the declarant was cooperating
with the police).
189 The fundamental premise of the note is that courts, beginning with the Court in Reynolds
v. United States, have been indifferent to the motivation of the declarant. Deahl, supra note
185, at 608-09. On the contrary, Justice Waite specifically found that Reynolds failed to reveal
the witness's location because he preferred to defend a weaker government case rather than
cross-examine her in court. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. To argue that courts
have ignored the intent to prevent testimony, is to ignore the development of the rule in wit-
ness tampering cases, and to ignore the fact that, before Crawford, courts consistently refused
to apply the rule when the reason for the witness's absence was not witness tampering. See
supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text. That argument also ignores the fact that the codi-
fication of the doctrine in Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6) and state codes specifically in-
cluded the intent to prevent testimony requirement, which had been established in the cases.
See supra notes 110-28.
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v. Zerbst is "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or pri-
vilege."'90 Reynolds and its progeny fit easily into this definition. Reynolds knew
his wife had testified in his previous trial, knew that the government was seeking
her testimony, and from his silence in court must be presumed to have known where
she was located.' 9' The Court rested its decision on his deliberate refusal to assist or
explain her absence.
92
The other cases that cite Reynolds involved defendants who were aware of their
Sixth Amendment right and who chose to forego the right. 93 In Diaz v. United States,
the Court held that the defendant's voluntary absence waived his Sixth Amendment
right to be present at the trial.' 94 The principle that voluntary absence from a trial
in progress was a waiver of the Sixth Amendment was subsequently reaffirmed in
Taylor v. United States, which held that it was so obvious that a specific warning
to the defendant about the loss of his rights was not required. 95 Illinois v. Allen'
96
was a true loss by misconduct case, although it did not cite Reynolds as precedent.
There, the Court upheld the forcible removal of a disruptive defendant from the court-
room.' 97 The defendant was repeatedly warned that his conduct would result in re-
moval from the courtroom, and that if he behaved he would be permitted to return.'9"
He did so and was returned to the courtroom. 99 According to the Court:
[W]e explicitly hold today that a defendant can lose his right to
be present at trial if, after he has been warned by the judge that he
will be removed if he continues his disruptive behavior, he never-
theless insists on conducting himself in a manner so disorderly, dis-
ruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be carried
on with him in the courtroom. Once lost, the right to be present
can, of course, be reclaimed as soon as the defendant is willing
to conduct himself consistently with the decorum and respect
inherent in the concept of courts and judicial proceedings.2°°
'90 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
19' Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 160 (1878).
'9 See supra notes 65-76 and accompanying text.
'13 West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258, 265 (1904) (finding that Reynolds is not inconsistent
with upholding a defendant's convictions based upon testimony at a prior hearing at which the
defendant was present), overruled in part by Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Mattox v.
United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895) (reciting the holding in Reynolds in a general
discussion of the admissibility of prior sworn testimony of now-deceased witnesses).
194 223 U.S. 442, 455 (1912).
191 414 U.S. 17, 19-20 (1973) (per curiam).
196 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
197 Id. at 343.
198 Id. at 339-40.
'99 Id. at 341.
20 Id. at 343 (footnote omitted).
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Justice Cardozo did make a reference to the loss of Sixth Amendment rights by
misconduct in Snyder v. Massachusetts: "No doubt the privilege [of being present
in the court] may be lost by consent or at times even by misconduct. Our concern
is with its extension when unmodified by waiver, either actual or imputed."' ' The
last sentence makes clear that the issue was when the right applied, rather than how
it could be lost. The precise issue in Snyder was whether the defendant had a right
to be present when the jury viewed the crime scene, and received information through
the prosecutor.20 2 The citation to Diaz v. United States, which involved the defen-
dant' s voluntary absence from trial,2"3 also suggests that an implied, if not actual,
waiver is necessary to justify the loss of confrontation rights.
The Court has consistently emphasized that Sixth Amendment rights are special,
which implies additional protections to protect against loss. Justice Black, in Zerbst,
also stated that every reasonable presumption should weigh against the loss of "fun-
damental" rights. 2°4 The case was remanded for a determination of whether the de-
fendant "did not competently and intelligently waive his right to counsel. 2 5 More-
over, the Court has stated that waiver and its additional protections particularly
apply to those rights that protect a fair trial and the reliability of the truth-determining
process.2° Sixth Amendment rights traditionally have required more elaborate pro-
cedures to waive the key rights to counsel20 7 or right to a trial by jury, and in parti-
cular, in entering a plea of guilty, which relinquishes all of the procedural protections
of a jury trial, including the right to confront the witnesses against the defendant.
The general mode of analysis for the formal loss of the right of confrontation always
has been framed as a waiver, requiring proof of knowledge and intent to relinquish
the right, or sufficient facts that, in context, support an implied waiver of the right.
B. The Role of Forfeiture in the Loss of Constitutional Rights
There are two circumstances when a defendant may be held truly to forfeit a
right without knowledge or intent to waive it. Defendants may be held to have for-
feited some rights by pleading guilty or by procedural default, that is, by failing to
raise a constitutional claim at the appropriate time or in the appropriate manner.
Both losses take place in judicial procedures, are monitored by the court, and are
201 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934) (citing Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 445 (1911)).
202 Id. at 104-05. The opinion does not discuss waiver, although Justice Cardozo noted
later in the opinion that the defendant conceded he was present during the crime and did not
object to diagrams and other evidence about the view. Id. at 109. These facts apparently were
recited to establish that the defendant suffered no harm by being kept from attending the view.
203 Diaz, 223 U.S. 442.
204 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
205 Id. at 469.
206 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1973).
207 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835-36 (1975).
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situations where the defendant and counsel, in the exercise of constitutional rights,
are bound by the elections they make. The forfeiture in these circumstances is a
collateral consequence of the deliberate and knowing waiver, or exercise, of rights
that are more central to the defendant's concerns. Neither situation provides any
support for applying true forfeiture principles to eliminate a defendant's constitutional
right based on pre-arrest conduct.
1. Forfeiture of Rights Incident to a Plea of Guilty
A guilty plea is the classic example of a knowing and voluntary waiver of con-
stitutional rights. Substantial resources are devoted to insuring that the defendant
and his counsel have the opportunity for obtaining the most complete knowledge
before making the choice between trial and plea. The defendant is represented by
counsel who has obligations to investigate and advise the client.08 The government
must provide exculpatory material in its possession2 9 as well as the means of further
investigating and presenting the defense.2"' The plea is a formal judicial proceed-
ing. The court has an independent duty to advise the defendant of his rights and to
make specific inquiries about the voluntariness and basis for the plea. In the federal
system, the defendant is specifically advised about the right to confront the witnesses."'
Necessarily, the focus of the defense and the defendant will be on those issues of
most importance to the pending case, be it the law, the expected testimony, or the
viability of identified defenses. There is no doubt that the defendant is aware of his
choices and their consequences. The plea process and the court's supervisory role
are intended to make clear these options so that the plea is a knowing voluntary waiver
of all the rights available at a trial.
Despite these efforts, knowledge is imperfect, and the future is unpredictable.
Counsel's reasonable advice may be incomplete and questionable in hindsight.1 2
The statute may subsequently be declared unconstitutional or case law changed. A
more extensive investigation may reveal a viable defense. The evidence may have
been seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, so it may be suppressed. The
key witness may have moved, or testimonial hearsay may be excluded. In sum, reas-
onable predictions may not be confirmed by experience. A plea, however, relinquishes
all defenses known and unknown, and generally, they may not subsequently be asserted.
It is those unknown rights which are said to be forfeited because the defendant may
not have been aware of or have specifically waived them.
208 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
209 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
210 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the ight... to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his de-
fence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
211 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(E).
212 McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 772 (1970) (holding that a plea based on rea-
sonably competent evidence is not open to collateral attack simply because counsel may have
misjudged the admissibility of a confession).
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This forfeiture of unknown issues or defenses, however, is a special situation.
It is precisely because of the availability of counsel with resources to prepare a de-
fense, and the detailed procedures for insuring that the plea is an informed decision,
that the forfeiture of unknown constitutional rights can be accepted. If there are de-
fects in the formal plea procedure,213 misrepresentations to the defendant or a failure
of the defendant to appreciate the nature of the plea,214 or inadequate counsel, 215 the
plea may be set aside and all constitutional claims resurrected. Even without these
defects, the Supreme Court has held that some unknown defenses are not waived by
a guilty plea.216 The true, voluntary, and knowing waiver of the right to trial is an
essential prerequisite to the forfeiture of unknown constitutional claims. This forfei-
ture of unknown defenses and issues is an inevitable consequence of an informed de-
cision and is entirely different from a forfeiture declared unilaterally by the state as
punishment for an act of wrongdoing.
2. Forfeiture Incident to a Procedural Default
Procedural default is the failure to assert a right in a timely or proper manner,
usually by the defense counsel, and perhaps without the defendant's knowledge or
consent, that prevents the subsequent assertion of that right.217 Although procedural
default lacks the formality of a plea, it shares many of its characteristics. Counsel
represents the defendant and has an obligation to investigate and to advise the client.
The government must provide counsel to indigents and the right to obtain witnesses
through subpoenas. Exculpatory material must be provided to the defendant. The
procedural decision points are established by statute, rule, or practice and must serve
a valid procedural purpose. Many of these are clearly set, as the time for post-trial
motions or the time to appeal, and others have procedural protections, such as the
waiver of a jury or the right to counsel at trial. These decisions can be anticipated,
preparations made, options identified and evaluated, and a reasoned choice made at
the appointed time.
Hearings and trials, however, present difficult legal and tactical decisions. Counsel
must quickly weigh the cost and benefit in an ambiguous situation and decide, often
without direct participation by the defendant. Many of these decisions are know-
213 McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969) (discussing the failure of the judge to
inquire whether the defendant understood the charges or to establish voluntariness of the plea).
214 Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976) (discussing the issue where the defendant was
unaware of an element of the crime).
215 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (per curiam).
216 See Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975) (holding that a double jeopardy claim is
not lost by a guilty plea); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974) (holding that the right to
challenge a reindictment on a felony charge after the defendant appealed the misdemeanor con-
viction is not waived by a plea to the felony).
217 Spritzer, supra note 31, at 475.
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ingly taken and are express waivers; however, not all such decisions are made with
adequate preparation or knowledge. The judge generally does not supervise them
as in a plea. For these reasons, there is a greater potential for error or inadvertence
by counsel and, at the same time, substantial leeway for hindsight about the efficacy
of a reasoned choice that fails to achieve its goal. Once a choice has been made, how-
ever, the trial moves on, and these choices can rarely be reconsidered or withdrawn.
Thus, the road not taken and the rights not asserted are forfeited.
Even so, the decision to assert or waive a constitutional claim is made by counsel
with access to, or the ability to investigate and obtain, relevant information to make
the decision, and almost all of these decisions can be anticipated before trial so that
preparations can be made. As with a plea, forfeiture by procedural default is a neces-
sary consequence of the exercise of other trial rights, and it is acceptable only because
there are established procedures to obtain sufficient information for counsel and the
defendant to make the decisions. The choice of one option necessarily forecloses
others. There is no way to explore every option to its conclusion. Even so, these risks
are mitigated by other procedures intended to prevent a miscarriage of justice. The
counsel must meet at least minimal standards for the profession, appellate courts
may reverse on plain error,2 8 and on collateral review, the Supreme Court may permit
a procedural default to be excused when cause for the default and prejudice from it
are established.2"9 The forfeiture of unknown rights pursuant to a plea is ameliorated
in practice.
The difference between the forfeiture articulated in the post-Crawford cases and
forfeiture by plea or procedural default is apparent and significant. The former is
based solely on the pretrial, and often pre-investigation or indictment, conduct of the
defendant, which, it is argued, necessarily forfeits a constitutional right. No know-
ledge or intent to relinquish a right is necessary. The forfeiture of unknown rights
in pleas and procedural defaults occurs in judicial proceedings that are structured
to provide the defendant with the substantial opportunity for knowledgeable choices.
Moreover, it is in knowingly exercising these rights to plead or to present a defense,
that choices made necessarily preclude other rights. The forfeiture of unknown
rights and issues is an inevitable consequence of prior voluntary choices, and it is
acceptable only because of the prior knowing and voluntary exercise of other rights.
Moreover, the forfeiture that occurs in pleas and procedural defaults occurs after a
plea or trial in which full rights have already been provided. Forfeiture in these situ-
ations is necessary to give finality to criminal convictions, with some limited excep-
tions. Forfeiture of constitutional rights in the trial process creates concerns about the
trial itself. Neither the plea nor procedural default provides any support for forfeiture
by wrongdoing.
218 FED. R. CiuM. P. 52(b).
219 Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (establishing the cause and prejudice standard
for avoiding procedural default).
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Moreover, a fundamental aspect of forfeiture is the idea of penalty for conduct
deemed detrimental to the state. But the Court does not use the charged criminal
conduct to trigger the loss of rights. Part of the reason is that approach would effec-
tively eliminate any constitutional rights. If a charge of murder, based on probable
cause, is sufficient to eliminate confrontation, why is it not sufficient to eliminate
other rights that the defendant enjoys under the Sixth Amendment? There are, how-
ever, two situations where it could be argued that the defendant's charged conduct
may have an effect on the defendant's constitutional right. They are the admission of
dying declarations and procedures limiting the defendant's face-to-face confrontation
with child victims.
220
The admission of dying declarations has a long lineage in English law. 22 The
Supreme Court recognized it as an exception to the Confrontation Clause based on
its history. The Court in Mattox v. United States referred to dying declarations being
admitted from "time immemorial" and said, "no one would have the hardihood at this
day to question their admissibility. 22 2 As a principle of evidence, the dying decla-
ration is based on the declarant's knowledge of impending death and not the defen-
dant's actions.
The principle of this exception to the general rule is founded part-
ly on the awful situation of the dying person, which is considered
to be as powerful over his conscience as the obligation of an oath,
and partly on the supposed absence of interest on the verge of the
next world, which dispenses with the necessity of cross-examina-
tion. But before such declarations can be admitted in evidence
against a prisoner, it must be satisfactorily proved, that the de-
ceased, at the time of making them, was conscious of his danger,
and had given up all hope of recovery.223
220 The Eighth Amendment might be considered another example. That amendment does
not provide a right to bail, only that any bail set must not be excessive. See Carlson v.
Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545-46 (1952). The amount of bail must appropriately further the
purposes of bail. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951). The most significant factor is the
seriousness of the crime which is relevant to the risk of flight. In these cases, however, the
seriousness of the charge does not forfeit the right to reasonable bail, although a reasonable
bail for a serious charge may make it too expensive to obtain.
221 See, e.g., King v. Reason, 16 How. St. Tr. 1, 24-38 (K.B. 1722) (Eng.). The early
evidence texts refer to it. See, e.g., ARCHBOLD, supra note 63, at 72 ("[U]pon an indictment
for murder, the dying declarations of the deceased are receivable in evidence, if it appear that
he was conscious of his being in a dying state at the time he made them."); 1 CHrr, supra note
63, at 569 (stating that the dying declaration.is the "one great and important exception" to
the hearsay rule); PEAKE, supra note 63, at 14-16 (stating that a dying declaration is admis-
sible "for murder where the deceased, while in the declared apprehension of death, or in such
imminent danger of it as must necessarily have raised that apprehension in his mind");
PHLLIPPS, supra note 63, at 200 ("The dying declarations of a person, who has received a
mortal injury, are constantly admitted in criminal prosecutions.
222 156 U.S. 237, 243-44 (1895).
223 ARCHBOLD, supra note 63, at 200-01.
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Moreover, the exception is limited to homicide cases and only to explain the cause
of the homicide. The history of the dying declaration exception, the rationale, and
the scope are separate from the recently emerging forfeiture rationale. It was never
based on any forfeiture analysis, and it does not provide any historical support for
the forfeiture principle.224
Maryland v. Craig 225 established that a defendant's right to face-to-face con-
frontation with an accuser can be limited when there is an individualized showing
that it is necessary to prevent trauma to a child witness in sexual abuse cases that
might affect the child's ability to testify.2 6 The Court made clear that the trauma
must be caused by the defendant's presence, rather than any anxiety arising from the
courtroom setting.227 Because most children are abused by persons in the family or
persons whom they know,228 the trauma must be from the defendant's alleged acts,
rather than merely from facing a stranger or the tensions of the courtroom.
The forfeiture rationale holds the defendant responsible for the witness's vulner-
able condition and argues that the right was lost by his own action. The Court, of
course, has not adopted that approach. Rather, the Court starts from the proposition
that the defendant does have the right to direct confrontation with the witness. The
right, however, is not absolute and is subject to some modification when special and
individualized circumstances are shown. The state's special interest in the protection
of children can overcome the defendant's right to direct confrontation when it will
cause trauma that affects the witness's ability to testify. In Craig, the Court upheld
the use of one-way closed circuit television for the witness's testimony.229 Particularly
important to the decision is that other aspects of confrontation were present: the
witness testified under oath; the judge, jury, and defendant observed the demeanor
of the witness; and counsel was present and able to cross-examine the accuser.23°
Thus, all of the other truth-enhancing features of confrontation were present except
the witness's ability to actually see the defendant.
224 Professor Richard Friedman suggests that dying declarations may be better rationalized
as an example of the forfeiture principle. He argues that this approach preserves the clarity and
simplicity of the "testimonial" approach and avoids an exception based originally on the tradi-
tional, and unpersuasive, argument for the reliability of dying declarations. Richard D. Friedman,
Adjusting to Crawford: High Court Decision Restores Confrontation Clause Protection, CRIM.
JUST., Summer 2004, at 4, 12. Certainly, a true forfeiture principle would subsume dying dec-
larations. But it is important to note that viewing dying declarations as forfeitures today does
not eliminate the long history of dying declarations which was not based on forfeiture, and
it does not provide justification for viewing forfeiture as well-established.
225 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
226 Id. at 858.
227 Id. at 856.
228 The victims in Craig attended a day school operated by the defendant. See id. at 840.
The victims in Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1014 (1988) (striking down the use of a screen be-
tween the victims and the defendant), were the next-door-neighbors of the defendant.
229 Craig, 497 U.S. at 852.
230 See id. at 857.
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A review of the Supreme Court's cases on confrontation clearly indicates that
waiver and implied waiver have been the only method of analyzing the loss of con-
stitutional rights. Forfeiture is not used by the Court to justify the loss of a constitu-
tional right. To be sure, a defendant exercising some constitutional rights or making
some trial decisions may be considered to have forfeited some constitutional rights
as a collateral consequence of entering a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea
or when trial decisions emphasizing some constitutional rights necessarily preclude
others. But there the loss of constitutional rights is part of the judicial process, depen-
ding upon constitutionally acceptable decision-making by counsel and client, and
it only applies to rights that are necessarily precluded by a knowing and deliberate
choice. A forfeiture in this context provides no support for forfeiture of a specific
constitutional right by conduct unrelated to the trial process. Moreover, the Court
has not considered a criminal act as sufficient to forfeit a right, as illustrated by both
the dying declaration and the restrictions on the face-to-face confrontation with child
victims.
IV. THE FORFEITURE RATIONALE IS UNDEFINED AND UNLIMITED
A. Problem Cases
The easy application of forfeiture is its principal advantage, but also its principal
disadvantage. The forfeiture rationale inherently has few limits. The logic is linear
and inexorable. If the defendant can be connected with a witness's unavailability
for any reason, the loss of confrontation rights is automatic. The justification for
forfeiture of constitutional rights - harm to the government - places no limits on
its application because there are no countervailing considerations to balance. Harm
to the government seems to flow automatically from the loss of a live witness.
Any theory justifying the loss of constitutional rights that does not consider the
intent of the actor inevitably will produce unacceptable and excessive results. Logi-
cally, if the harm to the government is the only factor, and the intent of the actor ir-
relevant, then a party who accidently collides with and kills a person who could tes-
tify would lose the right to confront that witness, specifically the right to object to
testimonial hearsay. Similarly, a defendant who correctly advises a potential witness
that the latter may invoke a valid privilege would also lose any Sixth Amendment
right, if the witness asserted the privilege at the defendant's trial."'
231 Professor Friedman argued that both situations did not necessarily prevent the operation
of the forfeiture. Friedman, Chutzpa, supra note 2, at 518 n.25 (defendant's accidental collision
affecting witness on way to court); id. at 519 n.30 (legitimate advice to claim a privilege may
avoid forfeiture only if witness is a close relative). But see People v. Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d
843, 850 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (requiring the defendant's act to be intentional and criminal but
not necessarily directed to preventing testimony).
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The legal advice scenario is not far fetched.232 The federal witness tampering
statute233 has been construed to reach legal advice intended to prevent testimony of
a witness,234 and there have been prosecutions against persons who provided non-
intimidating advice to other defendants.235 The forfeiture principle asks only if the
defendant's act of providing the advice prevented the witness's testimony. 236 If so,
232 See People v. Hampton, 842 N.E.2d 1124, 1130-31 (111. App. Ct. 2006) (remanding
for factual findings on the forfeiture issue where the defendant advised the witness to assert the
Fifth Amendment privilege).
233 18 U.S.C. § 1512 was enacted in 1982 to replace 18 U.S.C. § 1503 and to expand cover-
age to potential witnesses and those that provided inadmissible evidence. See Teresa Anne
Pesce, Note, Defining Witness Tampering Under 18 U.S. C. Section 1512,86 COLUM. L. REV.
1417, 1418-21 (1986). A person who "corruptly persuades" or attempts to persuade another
person to withhold testimony or avoid subpoena violates the statute. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)
(2000). The statute provides an affirmative defense when "the conduct consisted solely of
lawful conduct and... the defendant's sole intention was to encourage, induce, or cause the
other person to testify truthfully." 18 U.S.C. § 1512(d) (2000). This covers attorneys, and
perhaps clergy and close relatives.
234 Cole v. United States, 329 F.2d 437 (9th Cir. 1964). In Cole, the court framed the
question as:
whether advice to claim the constitutional privilege, which advice does
not have and was not designed to have any consequence in the way of
influencing the witness to violate any of his duties as a witness or in the
way of bringing about an effect upon the administration of justice that
is undue, corrupt or unlawful, can be as a matter of law the crime
defined by section 1503 [the predecessor to 1512].
Id. at 438-39. The court answered the question affirmatively. "[O]ne who bribes, coerces,
forces or threatens a witness to claim [the Fifth Amendment], or advises with corrupt motive
the witness to take it, can and does himself obstruct or influence the due administration of
justice." Id. at 443 (emphasis added).
235 United States v. Farrell, 126 F.3d 484 (3d Cir. 1997) (defendant acquitted when court
found advice not "corruptly" given). The result would be different under the forfeiture rule
which has no "corrupt" intent element.
236 The Department of Justice argued essentially for a forfeiture principle in its prosecution
of Arthur Andersen LLP for destruction of evidence as the Enron scandal unfolded. Arthur
Andersen LLP v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2129 (2005). The federal witness tampering statute
also prohibits "'knowingly ... corruptly persuad[ing] another' ... to 'withhold' [testimony
or destroy records] for use in, an 'official proceeding."' Id. at 2131 (quoting 18 U.S.C. §§
1512(b)(2)(A) & (B) (2000)). The Department of Justice argued, despite the "knowingly"
and "corruptly" language, that the statute should be interpreted to reach document destruction
even if the defendant honestly believed that the conduct was proper, and obtained jury instruc-
tions that allowed a conviction if the destruction simply impeded the government investigation.
Id. at 2134, 2136. The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the conviction finding that the
statutory language required proof of consciousness of wrongdoing. Id. at 2136, 2137. The
case is an important reminder of the consequences that flow from ignoring the intent element
and the potential for harm when a forfeiture principle, which only looks to the interests of the
government, is applied.
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the loss of confrontation rights follows automatically. It seems obvious that this
result is wrong, and, in fact, the courts reach a different conclusion when the issue
arises as the result of the government's conduct. Prosecutors often advise potential
defense witnesses of their right to avoid self-incrimination, and this advice often re-
sults in the loss of a defense witness. Currently the issue is analyzed under the Due
Process Clause. The cases distinguish between the prosecutor providing generic
information about rights and the consequences of false testimony, and conduct that
threatens government retaliation for providing defense testimony.237 Occasionally
this conduct rises to a violation of the due process rights of the defendant.238 Federal
Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6) applies to the government, 239 and the same result should
be reached under that rule, depending on whether the advice was "wrongdoing" inten-
ded to prevent the witness from testifying for the defense or merely the prosecutor
discharging an educational function. In any event, the federal witness tampering statute,
the Due Process standard, and Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6) reach appropriate
results only by considering the intent of the prosecutor. Analyzing the forfeiture
principle from the point of view of the government establishes the breadth of the
forfeiture rule because it would penalize conduct the courts have previously found
acceptable. If the forfeiture rule produces these unacceptable results when applied
to the government, it will produce unacceptable results when applied to defendants,
suggesting that the forfeiture principle itself should not be adopted.24
237 See United States v. Pierce, 62 F.3d 818, 832 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that the test is
whether the substance of the communication is a threat over and above what is necessary);
United States v. Simmons, 670 F.2d 365,369 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (citing a case where the prose-
cutor's actions were an improper threat to the deprive defense of a witness); United States v.
Gloria, 494 F.2d 477,484-85 (5th Cir. 1974) (finding no misconduct when the witness was
advised only of the possibility of prosecution if testimony differed from prior plea).
238 Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (1972) (per curiam); United States v. Vavages, 151 F.3d
1185, 1191 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that threatening withdrawal of a plea agreement was
impermissibly intimidating); United States v. Hammond, 598 F.2d 1008, 1012-13 (5th Cir.
1979) (finding threats by an FBI agent deprived the defendant of due process rights); United
States v. Thomas, 488 F.2d 334, 336 (6th Cir. 1973) (finding a threat to prosecute a defense
witness violated the due process rights of the defendant); United States v. Aguilar, 90 F.
Supp. 2d. 1152, 1166-70 (D. Colo. 2000) (finding improper a threat to withdraw a plea agree-
ment of a witness, but finding the defendant's constitutional claim procedurally barred).
239 See FED. R. EViD. 804(b)(6) advisory committee's note; United States v. Foster, 128
F.3d 949, 956-57 (6th Cir. 1997) (Merritt, J., concurring) (stating that forfeiture by wrong-
doing applied to government misconduct regarding witnesses); Minutes of the Meeting, supra
note 119; cf. Commonwealth v. Santiago, 822 A.2d 716, 729-31 (Pa. 2003) (finding that a
state statute comparable to 804(b)(6) did not apply to an assumed Brady violation because there
was no intent to deprive the defendant of a witness), cert. denied, 542 U.S. 942 (2004).
240 The Due Process analysis applied to the government limits the effect of the government's
action by requiring a strong connection between the act and the refusal to testify. There must
be a "substantial interference" with the decision not to testify. See, e.g., Williams v. Woodford,
306 F.3d 665, 700 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 400
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Another example of the importance of individual intent in the loss of consti-
tutional rights occurs when the rule is applied in conspiracy prosecutions. Federal
Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6) reaches those who "acquiesce" in the intimidation of
the witness, although they may not have directly participated in the act. By extension,
the courts have held that members of a conspiracy may lose their right to object to
hearsay evidence and to the loss of confrontation, even though they did not participate,
know, or approve of the intimidation of the witness. The court in United States v.
Cherry241 held that the principles of co-conspirator liability expressed in Pinkerton
v. United States242 were applicable to forfeiture by misconduct.243 Pinkerton held that
a member of a conspiracy did not have to participate in a crime to be held criminally
responsible for it if the crime was in furtherance of the conspiracy.2" By analogy,
all the conspirators did not have to act with the murderer of a witness to lose their
rights, so long as the murder was in furtherance of the conspiracy. The Seventh Circuit
also adopted the Pinkerton rationale for the evidence rule.245
The present witness intimidation rule, even with Pinkerton, may not be as broad
as it appears. There is some suggestion that Pinkerton liability is generally applied
only to the leadership of the conspiracy, and there are hints that the courts are sen-
sitive to the issue.2 6 In the evidence cases, the courts apparently accepted the princi-
ple, but they did not apply it to other members of the conspiracy for lack of proof that
the witness intimidation was in furtherance of the conspiracy,247 and, of course, there
(6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Pinto, 850 F.2d 927,932 (2d Cir. 1988)) ("The prosecution's
conduct must amount to a substantial interference with the defense witness's free and unhampered
determination to testify before the conduct violates the defendant's right to due process."). Like-
wise, the courts often conclude that the witness had independent reasons for asserting a pri-
vilege and refusing to appear. See United States v. Hooks, 848 F.2d 785, 801-02 (7th Cir. 1988)
(finding that the witness's decision was made on the advice of counsel); United States v. Hoffman,
832 F.2d 1299, 1305 (1st Cir. 1987) (finding no causal connection between the prosecutor's
ill-advised comments and the refusal to testify). Fairness suggests that there should be compar-
able proof when Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6) and the comparable constitutional rule are
applied to the defendant.
241 217 F.3d 811 (10th Cir. 2000).
242 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
243 Cherry, 217 F.3d at 818. But see Olson v. Green, 668 F.2d 421,428-29 (8th Cir. 1982)
(rejecting the state court's theory that the defendant was bound by threats of coconspirators).
244 Pinkerton, 328 U.S. 640.
245 United States v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 950,964-65 (7th Cir. 2002); see also United States
v. Rivera, 292 F. Supp. 2d 827, 832 (E.D. Va. 2003) (applying Pinkerton to a gang member who
knew the witness was cooperating with the govermment, and also knew of, and approved of, plans
to kill the witness), affid, 412 F.3d 562 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 670 (2005).
246 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830,851 (11 th Cir. 1985) (limiting Pinkerton
to those who played more than a minor role in the conspiracy). However, there are exceptions,
and Pinkerton provides no clear demarcation line in applying the rule.
247 Cherry, 217 F.3d at 816-18 (involving an interlocutory appeal and remanding the case
for consideration of whether the hearsay statements could be admitted against the other
members of the conspiracy). The conviction of Joshua Price, the murderer, was affirmed in
a subsequent opinion without mentioning the other defendants. United States v. Price, 265
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would have to be proof that the crime against the witness was intended to prevent
testimony.
The forfeiture rationale eliminates any requirement to prove witness intimida-
tion and allows the admission of hearsay on a broader range of issues. Forfeiture
also argues for reducing or eliminating the other limitations found in the current law.
Membership in a conspiracy is certainly wrongdoing. Harm to the government is
established by the loss of a live witness. Forfeiture makes the individual's intent ir-
relevant, so the lack of any knowledge or ability to influence other members of the
conspiracy regarding witness intimidation would have no bearing on the application
of the rule. Their limited role in the conspiracy should not be a consideration. The
sole issue would be whether the person intimidating the witness was acting in further-
ance of the conspiracy, which focuses on factors unrelated to any individual defendant
except the perpetrator of the violence. The result would be an open door to the loss
of confrontation rights of all defendants in a conspiracy and the admission of substan-
tial hearsay. The greatest potential for harm would be to the minor members who
have no connection with the acts of others, and no way to challenge evidence that is
unrelated to their activities.
B. The Tyranny of the "Forfeiture" Label
The post-Crawford development of the forfeiture rationale is notable for the
lack of analysis, the apparent rote citation of language, and a disinclination to examine
the facts of the precedents. It could be that forfeiture is so obvious that no counter-
arguments are possible, but enough has been presented to suggest the need for a
more searching waiver analysis. The reason for the uncritical acceptance to date is that
forfeiture is a powerful word which makes intent irrelevant, and wrongdoing suggests
a justified penalty for a crime. Both are emotionally satisfying factors because cri-
minal defendants are not a favored group, and hinging the loss of rights on a criminal
act that makes it more difficult to prosecute the crime seems appropriate at first glance.
Additionally, the crimes most affected - domestic violence and child sexual assault
- often have problems with complaining witnesses. These circumstances can lead to
unwarranted extensions simply because forfeiture has few restraints and encourages
arbitrary action and results.
F.3d 1097 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 731 (2005). In Thompson, the court of
appeals held that the other three conspirators could not have reasonably foreseen the
informant's murder because there had been no similar witness intimidation or murder before,
and the random violence experienced during the conspiracy was insufficient to put them on
notice. Thompson, 286 F.3d at 963. Despite the improper introduction of the hearsay, the
circuit court sustained all convictions finding harmless error because of overwhelming evi-
dence of their participation in the drug conspiracy, which made the hearsay unimportant and
cumulative to other testimony. Id.
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The forfeiture rationale has the potential to be applied when there is a tenuous
connection between the defendant's act and the loss of a witness's testimony. This
potential for abuse is shared with Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), but it is ameli-
orated by that Rule's element of intent to prevent testimony. For example, prosecu-
tors in two jurisdictions have argued that a defendant, who did not appear for trial, for-
feited any right to object to the hearsay statements of witnesses who were unavailable
when the trial was rescheduled.24 Failing to appear is wrongdoing, and, the prose-
cution argued, by so doing the government lost an opportunity to present the witness
when first scheduled. The connection is weak, at best. 249 The defendant did not act
against the witness. Moreover, the witness's unavailability at the rescheduled trial
date is due to factors that are unrelated to the defendant, including death from unre-
lated causes," ° the witness's own decision to move, the government's decision to de-
port the witness,25' or other intervening causes. Interestingly, in both cases, the hear-
say was not admitted because both jurisdictions found that the defendants lacked the
intent to prevent testimony.252 The result is not necessarily the same under a forfeiture
rationale, where only the harm to the government is considered. This suggests that
fairness requires a strong connection between the defendant's act and the witness's
unavailability when the witness asserts independent reasons for refusing to testify.
The most insidious aspect is that once it is accepted that a defendant's wrongdo-
ing forfeits rights, it necessarily affects how all subsequent decisions are viewed. One
aspect is the potential for circular reasoning under the rule. To prove the defendant
248 People v. Melchor, No. 1-03-3036, 2005 WL 1522715 (Ill. App. Ct. June 28, 2005),
modified, 2005 WL 3041536 (Ill. App. Ct. Nov. 14,2005); State v. Alvarez-Lopez, 98 P.3d
699 (N.M. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1334 (2005).
249 The pre-Crawford cases did not specifically address whether the defendant's act had
to be the sole cause, the predominant cause, or only one cause of the witness's unavailability.
This is particularly important when the witness is present but does not want to testify. The
courts are skeptical of the witness's statements of independent reasons for refusing to testify.
United States v. Scott, 284 F.3d 758, 765 (7th Cir. 2002) (rejecting a declarant's statements
about religious and moral reasons for refusing to testify); Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193
(6th Cir. 1982) (rejecting a declarant's marital privilege claim, but evidence of cohabitation
supported the finding that she was under control of the defendant); State v. Pierce, 364 N.W.2d
801, 807-08 (Minn. 1985) (rejecting a declarant's statements that the motive for not testify-
ing was not the defendant's threats but that the declarant did not want to be known as a snitch);
People v. Serrano, 644 N.Y.S.2d 162 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (finding a witness's disclaimers
of intimidation by the defendant "incredible"). Courts considering whether prosecutors have
violated the due process rights of defendants, by advice or warnings to potential defense wit-
nesses, often find intervening causes to avoid violations. See Flanagan, supra note 2, at 538-39.
250 Melchor, 2005 WL 3041536, at *1 (sole witness subsequently died of drug overdose
and codefendant deported).
2" Alvarez-Lopez, 98 P.3d at 703 (witness deported after serving sentence).
252 Melchor, 2004 WL 3041536, at *8; Alvarez-Lopez, 98 P.3d at 705. The result should
be the same even under a true forfeiture theory because the defendant's act did not cause the
witness's unavailability.
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guilty of the murder, the state must admit the victim's statement, which is contin-
gent on proof that the defendant killed the victim.25 3 The counterargument is that
there is no circular reasoning because these are two separate decisions, 254 and in a
jury trial, each is committed to a different factfinder. The decision to admit the hear-
say is a preliminary finding by the court, based upon a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant was responsible for the witness's unavailability. Thejury deter-
mines guilt or innocence of the crime by proof beyond a reasonable doubt based on
all the evidence, including the hearsay, but without knowing of the judge's preli-
minary finding on the defendant's responsibility for the homicide. A different prob-
lem of circularity, or "bootstrapping," comes when the hearsay itself may be consi-
dered in determining its admissibility. The Supreme Court has approved of the
latter practice,255 although there are sometimes requirements that the hearsay must
be corroborated.256 Notwithstanding these arguments, there is a potential for more
subtle effects. One court, in deciding not to rule before trial on the request to admit
a victim's statement, stated:
Allowing otherwise inadmissible evidence to prove a defendant's
guilt in a capital case based upon a judge's pretrial conclusion
that the defendant is in fact guilty of that very crime appears to
us to be a slippery slope. The resulting erosion of a defendant's
right to a trial of the issues by a jury of his peers could be sig-
nificant. The relaxation of the rules of evidence based upon the
Court's pretrial determination of the defendant's probable guilt
carries with it the very real possibility of someday substantially
eroding the defendant's right to be presumed innocent.257
253 United States v. Houlihan, 887 F. Supp. 352, 358 n.12 (D. Mass. 1995).
254 Friedman, Chutzpa, supra note 2, at 521-22.
255 FED. R. EvID. 104(a); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
256 FED. R. EviD. 801 (d)(2) (providing that a coconspirator's statement can be considered
but is not alone sufficient to determine admissibility). It is unclear whether the same standard
applies to statements admitted under the wrongdoing rationale. See United States v. Emery,
186 F.3d 921,927 (8th Cir. 1999) (expressing doubt that foundation requires evidence inde-
pendent of the hearsay and finding sufficient independent evidence); United States v. White,
116 F.3d 903, 914 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (leaving undecided whether foundation can rest exclusively
on hearsay). The testimony sometimes includes double hearsay. See Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d
1193, 1207 (6th Cir. 1982) (Taylor, J., dissenting) (noting that a declarant's statements were
of what she had heard other defendants say); People v. Cotto, 699 N.E.2d 394, 396-97 (N.Y.
1998) (noting that officers testified to the defendant's statements that he had heard that his
family was threatened and to the statements of the defendant's mother and sister about threats
they received).
257 United States v. Mikos, No. 02 CR 137-1, 2004 WL 1631675, at *5 (N.D. Ill. July 16,
2004) (declining to approve, upon proffer, admission of evidence of the victim allegedly mur-
dered by the defendant, but admitting some non-testimonial statements under Federal Rule
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The court was obviously concerned that the pretrial allegations and preliminary
proof would be insufficient when all the evidence was considered at trial. The state-
ment also reflects concern about prejudging a case.
Secondly, the forfeiture principle eliminates rights based solely on proof of
other criminal conduct, which weakens other protections simply because guilt is
presumed. Perhaps the most questionable result has been that reached by the New
York Court of Appeals. The court let stand lower court rulings that the forfeiture
by misconduct rationale led not only to the loss of the right to object to the hearsay,
but also the right to challenge the hearsay testimony itself. In People v. Geraci, the
court held that the defendant forfeits "the right to cross-examine about the substance
of those statements."5 8 That case involved an intimidated declarant who was pre-
pared to testify at trial that he had misidentified the defendant before the grand jury.
The court held that the government did not have to call the declarant in their case-
in-chief and that the grand jury testimony was sufficient proof linking the defendant
to the crime.2" 9 The jury never learned that the declarant had recanted his prior
testimony.26 The New York appellate opinions did not address the government's
failure to call an available witness or the denial of cross examination. The federal
courts reviewing the decision via habeas corpus concluded that there was no consti-
tutional violation because the defendant could have called the declarant to solicit the
testimony had he desired.26" '
A subsequent New York trial court went further when the intimidated declarant
was prepared to testify favorably for the defendant. There the court precluded any
cross-examination of the declarant for any purpose.262 The declarant apparently was
called and testified about events immediately before the murder but refused to identify
the perpetrator.263 The jury was removed, and after an evidentiary hearing, the court
of Evidence 807). See also 30B MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 7033, at 94 (2006) (suggesting that forfeiture in the case that led to the witness's unavailability
"completely alters the judge/jury relationship and arguably effectively denies the accused of the
jury trial").
258 People v. Geraci, 649 N.E.2d 817, 822 (N.Y. 1995).
259 These rulings appear in the subsequent federal habeas corpus proceeding. Geraci v.
Senkowski, 23 F. Supp. 2d 246, 250 (E.D.N.Y 1998), afftd, 211 F.3d 6 (2d Cir. 2000).
260 See id. at 263.
261 Id. The issue before the federal courts was whether there were constitutional violations
in finding the declarant "unavailable" although present and ready to testify (albeit recanting
his prior testimony) and whether the defendant's trial and appellate counsel were constitu-
tionally ineffective for not calling the declarant at trial. Id. at 261-63. The federal courts found
that there was no constitutional requirement that the declarant be actually unavailable to jus-
tify the admission of the hearsay, and that the trial counsel made a strategic decision not to call
the declarant who then would be subject to examination about the defendant's threats. Id.
262 People v. Cotto, 699 N.E.2d 394, 397 (N.Y. 1998).
263 Id.
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admitted the witness's pre-trial statements identifying the defendant as the murderer.264
The witness did not return to the stand, and the defendant was barred from cross-
examining and possibly impeaching the declarant on his motives for implicating the
defendant in the grand jury.265 The New York Court of Appeals held that the scope
of cross-examination was not preserved for appeal but implied in a footnote that it
was not endorsing loss of cross-examination as a general principle, only that special
circumstances justified the limitation of cross-examination in this case.266 The
Second Circuit granted the defendant's petition for habeas corpus and found that the
limitation violated the right to confrontation.267
There are sound reasons for limiting the misconduct exception to cases of wit-
ness tampering, based on precedent and the modem history of the rule. Moreover,
linking the loss of confrontation rights to witness tampering provides an inherently
understandable and acceptable justification for the loss of confrontation rights. At
the same time, there are sound reasons to reject a true forfeiture principle as inhe-
rently unlimited as well as inconsistent with precedent and the concept of consti-
tutional rights. There is something unsettling about a theory that provides that
constitutional protections against the government can be forfeit merely because an
act, albeit a criminal act, may make it more difficult for the government to convict
a defendant. That difficulty is part of the balance that the Founders established in
the Bill of Rights. In my view, the forfeiture rationale is not a legitimate way to
resolve the question because constitutional rights, which are personal rights, should
not be subject to loss under a theory that looks only to the interests of the state. Ad-
ditional reasons for rejecting the true forfeiture rationale are found in its essentially
equitable nature.
V. THE ESSENTIALLY EQUITABLE GROUNDS OF FORFEITURE BY WRONGDOING
Justice Scalia' s brief reference to forfeiture by wrongdoing characterizes it as
based on "essentially equitable grounds." '268 Besides the explicit waiver on which
the decision was based, 269 Reynolds v. United States can be read to state two justi-
fications for the loss of confrontation. The most often cited language of Reynolds,
taken in isolation, states a principle of forfeiture: "The rule has its foundation in the
264 Id. at 396-97.
265 Id. at 403 (Smith, J., dissenting).
266 Id. at 399 n.2.
267 Cotto v. Herbert, 331 F.3d 217 (2d Cir. 2003).
268 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004) ("For example, the rule of forfeiture
by wrongdoing (which we accept) extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable
grounds; it does not purport to be an alternate means of determining reliability.").
269 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 160 (1878); supra notes 65-76 and accom-
panying text.
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maxim that no one shall be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong.' 27 Estop-
pel is the second principle: "[B]ut if a witness is absent by his own wrongful procure-
ment, he cannot complain if competent evidence is admitted to supply the place of
that which he has kept away. 271
Professor Friedman argues that "forfeiture" by wrongdoing should not be based
on the first maxim because the loss of confrontation is neither sufficient nor necessary
to prevent the wrongdoer from benefiting from the wrong. It is not sufficient to pre-
vent a benefit in those cases where the sanctions for the crime being tried are greater
than the sanctions of admitting the uncrossed hearsay. A defendant facing a high
penalty crime might deliberately engage in witness intimidation when the hearsay
is less persuasive than the live testimony. The defendant may actually benefit by
preventing the live testimony, lessening the possibility of conviction on the more
serious crime. Likewise, the loss of confrontation is not necessary when the defendant
is being tried for murder of a potential witness because that crime has a far greater
sanction than the loss of one constitutional right.272
There is a more fundamental objection to the use of this maxim. It is often used
in civil law to prevent the beneficiary of an insurance policy or a will from taking
when the beneficiary caused the death of the insured or testator.273 The financial pro-
ceeds from a policy or an estate are benefits of the crime, and greed provides the mo-
tive for many murders. Constitutional rights, however, are not "benefits" of a crime
in that sense.274 They do not derive from the crime at all, and certainly no one commits
crimes in order to obtain constitutional rights in a criminal trial. Rather, confrontation
and the other constitutional rights are the personal rights of the individual, inherent
270 Id. at 159.
271 Id. at 158. Courts have recognized the equitable aspect of the rule. See United States
v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 950, 962 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. White, 116 F.2d 903,
911 (D.C. Cir. 1997), for view that person who has removed a witness is in a weak position
to complain about the loss of confrontation of that witness), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1134(2003).
272 Friedman, Chutzpa, supra note 2, at 516-17.
273 E.g., Cheatle v. Cheatle, 662 A.2d 1362, 1365 (D.C. 1995) (citing common law barring
a murderer from receiving insurance proceeds of the victim); Price v. Hitaffer, 165 A. 470
(Md. 1933) (citing the common law prohibition precluding a murderer from inheriting an
estate); Ahmed v. Ahmed, 817 N.E.2d 424, 426 (Ohio App. 2004) (stating that federal common
law prohibits a murderer from receiving proceeds of an insurance policy on the victim).
274 There is an assumption that the defendant benefits from the victim-witness's unavail-
ability, which is unjustified in many cases. Premeditated murders aside, many homicides are
assaults gone horribly wrong, and in those cases the defense has lost live testimony, which
loss adversely affects the defense, particularly when there is a claim of self-defense, accident,
or provocation that the victim may corroborate in part. Moreover, a defendant, responsible for
a witness's unavailability, cannot use that fact to admit other hearsay of the victim. See FED.
R. EVID. 804(a) (stating that a witness is not unavailable if the absence is procured by the de-
fendant); Sweet v. United States, 756 A.2d 366, 379 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that a defendant
responsible for a witness's absence may not admit the absent witness's exculpatory statement);
United States v. White, 838 F. Supp. 618,625 n. 10 (D.D.C. 1993), affd, 116 F.3d 903 (1997),
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 960 (1997); Wisconsin v. Frambs, 460 N.W.2d 811 (Wisc. 1990) (same).
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in citizenship and accorded defendants tried in our courts."' They are the funda-
mental law of the land, and specifically limit the government's power to obtain convic-
tions. Confrontation, in particular, is a procedural right deemed necessary to ensure
the fairness of the criminal process. To treat a constitutional right as a benefit of
the crime, particularly one that can be lost because it is a benefit, is to ignore the fun-
damental nature of constitutional rights. This "benefits" argument proves too much
because it can be used to eliminate all constitutional rights. The same logic makes all
Sixth Amendment rights forfeitable "benefits" of the crime.
The second, significantly different rationale is estoppel. Professor Friedman dis-
tinguishes the two in these terms:
In other words, the forfeiture principle does not say to the accused,
"You have done wrong, and so we will put you in a position no
better for you than that in which you would have been had you
done no wrong." Rather, it says in effect, "You have no valid
complaint about the loss of a right that, as a natural and desired
result of your own conduct, it is impossible to afford you." '276
An estoppel-based theory produces the same results as waiver and is fundamen-
tally inconsistent with a true forfeiture rationale. This can be seen by examining the
elements of equitable estoppel. Traditionally, there are six prerequisites to equitable
estoppel: (1) conduct, including silence "amounting to a representation or a con-
cealment of material facts"; (2) the truth of the facts must be known or should have
been known to the party at the time of the conduct; (3) the truth must be unknown
to the party claiming estoppel; (4) the conduct must have been done with the know-
ledge or expectation that it would be relied upon; (5) the conduct must have been
relied upon; and (6) the party claiming estoppel must have been acted upon it to his
detriment.2"
These elements express three fundamental characteristics. First, equitable estop-
pel is based on a knowing and intentional act done in circumstances where the actor
275 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819, 829-30 (1975) (identifying notice, confronta-
tion, and compulsory process as personal rights).
276 Friedman, Chutzpa, supra note 2, at 518. See also Friedman, supra note 224, at 12
(stating that the "appropriate response" to lack of confrontation claim, even when homicide not
directed at potential testimony, is: "And whose fault is that? You murdered him.").
277 3 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 805, at 191-92
(Spence W. Symons ed., 1941). There are several definitions of estoppel, often with slightly
different elements. One concise formulation is that estoppel has "three elements: (1) an act
or statement inconsistent with the right later asserted; reliance on such act or statement; and
(3) injury." Central Microfilm Serv. Corp. v. Basic/Four Corp., 688 F.2d 1206, 1218 (8th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1204 (1983).
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knew, or should have known, that it would mislead others.278 The estoppel arises
because the actor has knowingly and deliberately created a situation in which it
would be unfair for him to subsequently change position. As applied to the loss of con-
frontation rights, estoppel requires more than an act against a person. It mandates
that the one to be estopped has deliberately and knowingly created the situation in
which it would be unfair for him to claim confrontation.279 This requires the actor
to know that his act is inconsistent with the right of confrontation, which, in turn,
demands that he be acting against a witness and not a person. This is consistent with
the implied waiver analysis used by the Court. Estoppel is also similar to waiver in
that estoppel is an equitable defense which defeats a claim of a Sixth Amendment
violation. Estoppel places the burden of proof on the prosecution to establish the ele-
ments for the rule, as does waiver. Forfeiture ignores intent and is not a defense,
but a theory that affirmatively divests a constitutional right if its requirements are met.
The other significant characteristics of equitable estoppel also provide depth to
the waiver-by-misconduct rule and address some of the problems with a true forfei-
ture rationale. The second characteristic of equitable estoppel is that it requires proof
of a strong connection between the act and the detrimental reliance. This aspect is a
necessary consequence of the strict requirements imposed on the party estopped as
well as the party seeking estoppel. For example, the party estopped is not responsible
for statements not known to be false, nor misrepresentations in circumstances where re-
liance would be unreasonable.28° Similarly, estoppel is unavailable if the claimant
knew, or had the means to know that the statement was false,28' or if the claimant
acted for other reasons, or if the misrepresentation did not produce a detriment in fact.
Thus, intervening causes, or reasons for acting unrelated to the misrepresentation, are
insufficient to support estoppel.
As applied to waiver by wrongdoing, equity suggests that the court should care-
fully consider the causal connection between the act of the defendant and the witness's
unavailability. This is particularly important when the witness can appear in court
but other reasons are asserted to prevent testimony. For example, the assertion of a valid
278 3 POMEROY, supra note 277, § 809, at 216.
279 The estoppel is "essentially" equitable because equitable estoppel has two elements that
are not applicable to the witness tampering scenario. The defendant's wrongdoing does not
mislead the prosecution in this sense, nor does the prosecution rely on the defendant's wrong-
doing to its detriment. Nevertheless, the theory is essentially equitable because the core of
estoppel, as well as of the rule applied here, is that one's act may preclude the actor's ability to
have something inconsistent with that act.
280 See id.
281 Id. § 810, at 219.
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privilege, regardless of how suggested, should not be charged against a defendant.282
Others have noted the particularly difficult questions of causation that arise when
child witnesses are involved.283 Then, the question is whether the crime caused the
inability to testify or whether it is due to the child's tender age, to the child's condi-
tion, or the concerns of a parent, or in fact, due to a tactical decision that the case may
be more effectively tried by introducing the hearsay. Equity, with its requirement
of proof of causation, argues that the wrongdoing must be the predominant cause
of the inability to testify, not just one of several factors.
The third important characteristic of estoppel is that the party claiming estoppel
independently must satisfy some requirements before taking advantage of equitable
estoppel. The equitable maxims of "unclean hands," "equity favors the vigilant,"
and "he who seeks equity must do equity," all focus on the movant's role and may
disqualify him from relief if his conduct was responsible for the harm.2 4 Equitable
estoppel, for example, requires that the movant must not have been negligent in relying
on the misrepresentation. If the movant unreasonably failed to use available means for
discovering the truth, then estoppel is denied.
These requirements have important ramifications in a post-Crawfordenvironment.
Previously, the primary purpose of the Confrontation Clause was only to prevent the in-
troduction of unreliable hearsay that fell outside a firmly-rooted hearsay exception and
that did not otherwise satisfy the reliability standards of Idaho v. Wright.285 Crawford,
with its finding that confrontation was an essential aspect of a fair trial, and its categor-
ical requirement of confrontation when testimonial statements are used, implies a gov-
ernment obligation to present direct testimony and confrontation by requiring the op-
portunity to cross-examine testimonial statements.2 6 Crawford is clearly changing the
way evidence will be developed and presented. 287 Thus, there should be a preference
282 For example, in Crawford, the defendant, Michael Crawford, had a right under Washing-
ton law to prevent his wife from testifying. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). Had he invoked this right, a for-
feiture theory would argue that he lost his claim to confrontation. However, Sylvia Crawford in-
stigated the assault, was present during the assault, and had a valid right against self-incrimination.
See id. at 38-40. Had both asserted their respective rights, Michael should have retained his
right to confrontation to the extent it applied to testimonial hearsay. Threats or pressure to assert
an invalid privilege, however, lead to a different result. See Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193 (6th
Cir. 1982).
283 Richard D. Friedman, The Conundrum of Children, Confrontation, and Hearsay, 65
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 243, 253-54 (2002).
284 For a list of the traditional equitable maxims, see KENNETH H. YORK ET AL., CASES
AND MATERIALS ON REMEDIES 30-31 (5th ed. 1992).
285 497 U.S. 805,815 (1990) (approving introduction of hearsay under exceptions that are
not "firmly rooted" if there are "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" in the statement
itself).
286 Friedman & McCormack, supra note 29 (arguing before Crawford that a testimonial
approach to the Confrontation Clause would properly limit the use of victimless prosecutions).
287 Mosteller, supra note 6, at 514.
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for having the government present live testimony when admitting the witness's prior
statements.288 Similar arguments have been made for creating evidentiary rules that
encourage the live testimony of child witnesses.289 Other commentators have pro-
posed expanding the opportunity for pretrial cross-examination. Read affirmatively,
Crawford requires the use of live witnesses whenever possible.
Similarly, in applying the major exception to testimonial hearsay, Crawford, as
well as the equitable principles, argue for considering the government's need for un-
confronted testimonial hearsay in lieu of live testimony. There are often situations
where the government may establish a point either by direct evidence of a witness or
through hearsay under the forfeiture analysis. When either option is viable, equity
and Crawford argue for live testimony rather than the use of estoppel.29°
A related aspect is the comparative harm suffered and whether it merits relief,
even if the elements of estoppel are met. Ultimately, the question is the admissibility
of certain evidence. Testimonial statements, however, often are not of equal importance.
The hearsay statements in the post-Crawford cases roughly divide between hearsay
statements regarding the defendant's involvement in the crime charged and the admis-
sion of prior conduct evidence.29" ' Testimonial statements describing the crime charged
288 See id. at 578-86; Friedman, Chutzpa, supra note 2, at 529-30, 530 n.52 (arguing for
a government obligation to preserve confrontation to the extent possible).
289 Mosteller, supra note 6, at 591-94 (discussing an Oregon law which permits the
introduction of victim hearsay statements on testimony of the victim at trial).
29 The obligation of the government to use witnesses rather than hearsay was a subsidiary
in the Mastrangelo case. Mastrangelo's participation in illegal drugs could be proved through
the grand jury testimony of the murdered James Bennett and also through the testimony of
his nephew, Joseph Bennet, who had already pled guilty. United States v. Mastrangelo, 561
F. Supp. 1114, 1121 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), affid, 722 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467
U.S. 1204 (1984). In 1982, the grand jury hearsay was admissible only under the residuary
provision Federal Rule of Evidence 807 (then denominated as FED. R. EviD. 804(b)(5)) which
required proof that the hearsay was more probative than other available evidence. See id. In
moving to admit James Bennett's grand jury testimony, the government did not reveal the exis-
tence of Joseph Bennett and, in fact, had promised him that he would not be called to testify
against his uncle if he provided an off-the-record proffer of his knowledge. See id. at 1122.
When this information became known, Mastrangelo argued that James Bennett's grand jury
testimony was inadmissible because the government had failed to establish that the more pro-
bative testimony of Joseph Bennett was unavailable, and that it had failed to use reasonable
efforts to procure it. Id. The trial judge ultimately rejected the argument, but was critical of
the government for its lack of candor, and noted that government promises to a potential wit-
ness that he would not have to testify did not necessarily make him an unavailable witness. Id.
at 1123.
291 See United States v. Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d 364, 370 (6th Cir. 2005) (the victim's
statement to police describing the defendant's assault five months before murder); People v.
Baca, No. E032929, 2004 WL 2750083, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 2,2004) (the victim's identi-
fication of the defendant); People v. Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843,846 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (the
victim's statements to the police describing a previous assault); People v. Jiles, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d
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obviously are more important (and the harm greater when excluded) than propensity
evidence based on prior bad acts, which is both indirect and carries with it some
concern for the prejudicial aspects. Similarly, the availability of other witnesses on
the same or similar points also argues for a rule of preference that when the prosecu-
tion can achieve the same goal by other forms of evidence, the testimonial hearsay state-
ments should not be admitted.292 An additional factor to consider is the general assump-
tion that hearsay is a less useful form of evidence, but that is not always the case. Tes-
timonial statements, unlike live testimony, are not subject to modification, qualification,
and recantation, which may provide an advantage to the movant. Crawford and equity
argue that the prosecution cannot automatically rely on testimonial hearsay in these circ-
umstances, but has to use the direct testimony when available, or at least justify the
decision not to do so before resorting to testimonial hearsay under the "forfeiture"
doctrine. Equitable principles suggest that the court should consider at least the fol-
lowing factors: the strength of the causal link between the defendant's acts and the
witness's unavailability; whether the testimonial statement is direct evidence or pro-
pensity evidence; the importance of testimonial statement to the prosecution; the avail-
ability of alternate forms of proof subject to confrontation; and the availability of alter-
nate means of providing confrontation for that statement. In effect, equitable prin-
ciples require greater analysis and support before overriding a constitutional protection.
VI. WAIVER, FORFEITURE, EQuITY, AND HOMICIDE AND
ITS UNINTENDED EFFECT ON TESTIMONY
A. Waiver Versus Forfeiture
The waiver rationale has the significant advantages of being consistent with the
case law as well as the Court's traditional approach to an individual's surrender of
constitutional rights. The case law has always viewed the loss of confrontation rights
as driven by concerns about the defendant's acts affecting trial testimony. Certainly
the modem development by the federal courts after 1976, and the adoption of Federal
Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), was aimed exclusively at witness intimidation. Second,
the waiver analysis is consistent with the Court's traditional approach to analyzing
the individual's relinquishment of a constitutional right. Constitutional rights are
790,794 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (the victim's statement identifying her husband as the perpetrator);
People v. Pantoja, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 492,496-97 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (the victim's statements
about her husband in application for a restraining order); People v. Moore, 117 P.3d 1, 3 (Colo.
Ct. App. 2004) (the victim's statements of prior assaults); State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789, 793-94
(Kan. 2004) (the victim's statement to police identifying the defendant); Gonzalez v. State, 155
S.W.3d 603,605 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (the victim's statement identifying the defendant).
292 But see La Torres v. Walker, 216 F. Supp. 2d 157, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that
the hearsay was admissible although other witnesses were called and could have testified in per-
son about the events described in the hearsay).
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personal rights, and the waiver rationale examines whether the individual has actually
or implicitly waived his rights. The Court has continuously cited the waiver stan-
dard of Johnson v. Zerbst293 and at least given lip service to the idea that a pre-
sumption exists against the waiver (loss) of a constitutional right. Moreover, all of
the major confrontation cases have involved situations where the knowledge and
intent were inferred from acts taking place in the context of the judicial process.
The forfeiture, rather than waiver, of constitutional rights is an entirely new concept.
There is no comparable tradition finding that an individual had lost a significant
trial right because of conduct taking place outside the judicial process. Forfeiture
of constitutional rights, to the extent that it occurs, takes place only as a necessary
consequence of the defendant's informed decisions to enter a plea or to select among
procedural alternatives during a trial. In both a plea and procedural default situa-
tions, the forfeiture of remaining rights is acceptable only to the extent that the initial
decision satisfied constitutional standards for a knowing, voluntary decision.
The waiver analysis, and its focus on the individual's knowledge and intent, is
a well-established doctrine that the courts have always applied. By focusing on
proof of the individual's intentional conduct directed at the judicial process, a waiver
analysis has a compelling and unquestionable rationale. A defendant who acts with
intent to prevent testimony has no argument against the loss of any constitutional
right arising out of that act. Perhaps more important, the intent requirement gives
it well-defined contours. The waiver analysis, and its intent requirement, necessarily
means that the waiver will apply in the most appropriate cases. Fewer situations
will arise where the rule can lead to errors of law, and fewer wrongful convictions
will result. The waiver analysis draws the line so that the benefit of the doubt is given
the individual, which is appropriate when the issue is the application of constitutional
rights. The waiver analysis is more consistent with our view of constitutional rights.
These fundamental, personal rights are protections against arbitrary actions by the
state. If they are to be relinquished, it is more appropriate to do so based upon inten-
tional acts related to the trial process than upon a theory that emphasizes the interests
of the state.294
293 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
294 There are two other justifications for the intent standard. First, it may have the advantage
of admitting more reliable hearsay. Proof that the defendant intended to prevent a witness
from testifying supports the inference that the testimony is reliable. This is true of the in-
ference from the destruction of evidence, which also requires proof of more than the act of
destruction. No inference can be drawn from an act which has as one of its unintended conse-
quences the prevention of testimony. The inference is not infallible. The defendant has the
same incentive to act regardless of whether it is true or not, since the effect, if it is introduced
is to create the risk of a conviction, wrongful or not. Another rationale that often appears in the
opinions is the argument that the rule is necessary to protect witnesses and to remove the
incentives to murder witnesses. Second, to the extent that rules of evidence or constitutional
standards deter more than existing criminal sanctions, a rule directed specifically to witness
tampering will be more effective than one that relates only to the trial process.
[Vol. 14:11931246
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The arguments for a waiver-based theory are enhanced by the essentially equitable
nature of the misconduct exception. Equitable estoppel has a strong knowledge or
intent requirement. Only if the person estopped knows that the misrepresentation
is false and likely to mislead others is the rule satisfied. Similarly, waiver by mis-
conduct requires knowledge of the defendant, of the judicial process, and of poten-
tial testimony. In addition, equitable considerations also emphasize the need for a
strong connection between the defendant's act and the actual loss of testimony.
Strong proof preserves confrontation rights when the decision not to testify is due
to other intervening causes, including the witness's individual choices. The advan-
tages of waiver are also the disadvantages of forfeiture. Forfeiture is not supported
by the cases nor by the Court's previous approach to the problem; it is inconsistent
with the purpose of constitutional rights; and it is inherently expansive, with many
uncertain applications in criminal and constitutional law.
B. The Hard Case - Domestic Homicide
The waiver-by-misconduct rule of evidence and constitutional law has been
successfully applied for more than thirty years. It reaches the most egregious case
of violence against witnesses and, because of its limitations and inherent rationality,
has generated little criticism. The most difficult case for the constitutional standard
of waiver is the domestic homicide case such as California v. Giles,295 where the
crime was unrelated to potential testimony. The waiver standard excludes it. The
forfeiture standard admits it. How can this exclusion be justified in light of the
strong case for admissibility? Unquestionably, the defendant attacked the victim,
although without intent to prevent testimony. The homicide prevents any face-to-
face confrontation, and the hearsay may be the next best evidence on a relevant
point. In addition, confrontation may be different from other Sixth Amendment
rights. The other Sixth Amendment rights can be met by the government through
its resources, but only confrontation may be precluded by acts of the defendants and
others beyond the government's control. How can the defendant take advantage of
a situation he created, albeit unintentionally? This point of view is captured by
Professor Friedman's colorful title, Confrontation and the Definition of Chutzpa,296
in which he compared a defendant's assertion of confrontation rights to the person
who murdered his parents and then claimed sympathy for being an orphan. Like
"forfeiture" and the maxim that no one should benefit from his own wrongdoing,
the title has emotional weight, but a proper assessment requires a deeper look.
There is no unusual nerve or chutzpa in claiming the right to confrontation.
Asserting the right in these circumstances is the same as a factually guilty defendant
pleading innocent, or a defendant caught with contraband asserting Fourth Amendment
295 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 843 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), cert. granted, 102 P.3d 930 (Cal. 2004).
296 Supra note 2.
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rights. The Constitution requires that the prosecution prove the defendant guilty in
a manner consistent with constitutional procedure, and the defendant may require
the state to conform to those requirements. The appropriate mental state is a key
issue in many constitutional rights, including the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.297
Second, forfeiture and the chutzpa designation carry connotations of blame for the
act against the declarant. The issue is not whether the defendant should be punished
for that crime. The issue is one of constitutional procedure, whether the government
should be held to the Framers' view, articulated in Crawford, that "testimonial" state-
ments of unavailable witnesses should be subject to cross examination by the defen-
dant at some point.298 While the defendant's act is relevant, it is not necessarily de-
cisive.
The Court's categorical approach to the Confrontation Clause also reduces or
eliminates other arguments. Claims that the hearsay is needed or that it is more
reliable are not persuasive in the application of the rule because they do not create
exceptions to testimonial statements. That the homicide prevents any face-to-face
confrontation also is not decisive. The Court has consistently held that the Confron-
tation Clause applies beyond witnesses who appear and testify and includes hearsay
statements.299 Its application to hearsay is essential to an effective Confrontation
Clause.3" Finally, the categorical approach necessarily means that some hearsay
deemed testimonial will be excluded and other hearsay will be admitted, so the fact
that the waiver-based rule provides a narrower exception than forfeiture is not de-
cisive, and is what appropriate constitutional standards are expected to do.30'
Stripped to its essentials, the issue is whether the defendant's act alone is suffi-
cient to lose confrontation rights. The waiver rationale makes the act alone insufficient;
297 The relinquishment of constitutional rights is always dependent upon the appropriate
mental state. The standards are different in the pre-arrest or pre-indictment situations, from
the waivers required of trial rights. For example, a person must voluntarily consent to a
search. Formal notice of the right to refuse consent is not required, but may be considered
in determining whether the consent was voluntary. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218 (1973). Similarly, no warnings of rights are required when a person is asked questions
by the police. Once in custody, however, the accused must be warned of his Miranda rights
and must voluntarily consent to the questioning. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986)
(finding that the defendant must make a voluntary choice with full awareness of the rights and
of the consequences of the decision to waive the rights). A consent to interrogation, however,
does not mean that a subsequent confession may not be coerced. See, e.g., United States v.
Syslo, 303 F.3d 860 (8th Cir. 2002) (stating that a Miranda waiver is insufficient when the
defendant was coerced by the police holding her children at the station until she confessed).
298 See supra notes 3-11 and accompanying text.
299 See supra notes 3-15 and accompanying text.
31 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50-51 (2004).
301 The effect of the waiver and forfeiture rationales on prosecutions may be less that
anticipated. Many statements will not be "testimonial." Proof of intent to prevent testimony
is relative low. See supra notes 100-09 and accompanying text. Others may be dying decla-
rations, and in many others, the point may be established by other admissible evidence. After
all, prosecutions were successful for centuries without a general exception admitting homicide
victims' statements.
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intent is necessary for two major reasons. First, intent, or implied intent, provides
the essential connection between the defendant's act and the loss of the confronta-
tion rights that supports and justifies the loss of confrontation. Intent satisfies our
view of constitutional rights as personal rights, and how they may be relinquished
by personal decision. Second, intent is a necessary limiting factor in the application
of the rule. This is supported by the essentially equitable nature of the tenet, as well
as other rules that apply when a party is implicated in the loss of evidence.
Ultimately, the decision is who has the burden if the witness is unavailable.
Generally the government bears this risk because of its obligation to prove guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt. The witness-intimidation rule properly shifts that risk to
the defendant when there is proof of intent to prevent testimony. Between those ex-
tremes are the cases where the defendant's act of homicide prevents the witnesses
from testifying, but it was an uncontemplated consequence of that act. In any homi-
cide case where future testimony is not a motivation, the effect of the loss of testi-
mony will not be known at the time of the crime. Forfeiture assumes that it favors
the defendant, but this is not true. Many homicides, other than deliberate and preme-
ditated murders, are assaults gone horribly wrong. Consider what would happen if
the victims had survived and the charge was assault with a deadly weapon, which
carries a comparable sentence. Universally, defendants would cross-examine the vic-
tim precisely because of the seriousness of the crime, and its motivation. Alterna-
tively, provocation or mitigation may be exposed and perhaps corroborated by the
victim. Defendants lose significantly when a witness is not present at the trial. More-
over, the prosecution may gain by keeping a highly impeachable or unlikeable witness
from being seen by the jury and instead hearing the evidence via a more presentable
witness repeating more sanitized, and unalterable, hearsay. Because the consequences
of the homicide on a trial are unknown or not considered at the time it is committed,
and may fall either on the prosecution or defendant, then perhaps the rule for the
more difficult case is to leave the burdens where they originally lay.
CONCLUSION
A fertile source of perversion in constitutional theory is the
tyranny of labels.... [A] court frames a rule which is general
in form, though it has been wrought under the pressure of parti-
cular situations. Forthwith another situation is placed under the
rule because it is fitted to the words, though related faintly, if at
all, to the reasons that brought the rule into existence.3 2
Justice Cardozo's quotation sums up the misnamed "forfeiture"-by-wrongdoing doc-
trine. The case law on waiver-by-misconduct up to Crawford, almost without excep-
tion, was based on an express or implied waiver of the right to confrontation caused
'02 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 114 (1934), overruled by Mallow v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1 (1964).
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by the defendant's attack on the person because of his status as a witness. Had
Justice Scalia relied on history and said that the majority accepted the rule of waiver
by wrongdoing, the case law and constitutional standard for loss of the right of con-
frontation would have continued to develop as before and continued to consider the
knowledge and intent of the defendant, as implied by his act against a witness. Justice
Scalia, instead, wrote forfeiture-by-wrongdoing, and that label altered the rationale
of the rule, changed the focus from the defendant to the interests of the state, and
potentially expanded it to reach every case where the defendant could be connected
to the witness's unavailability by some chain of logic. These changes cannot be sup-
ported by any of the pre-Crawford precedents, either of the doctrine or of the Court's
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. Precedent argues for waiver and not forfeiture.
Precedent, of course, will not always carry the day when constitutional standards
are determined. Any principle must be justified by argument and analysis - and
there are significant differences between waiver and forfeiture - and a full appre-
ciation of the consequences of either approach. One compelling reason for the waiver
standard is our conception of constitutional rights as belonging to the individual and
requiring some knowing and intentional act to relinquish them. A second is the lack
of any inherent limitations of the forfeiture rationale, particularly when it looks only
to the interests of the state. A third reason is found in equitable principles, which
support a waiver of rights when aimed at witness tampering, but not otherwise, and
which also provide contours to the doctrine. To date there has not been this debate,
either in the courts or in the commentary, about the consequences of either option.
Since Crawford, it has largely been a matter of labeling. It truly would be a "tyranny
of labels" if the forfeiture theory is accepted solely because of its name.
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